Citations of
Parimal Bag

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Working papers

1. Bag, P.K. & Sabourian, H., 2004. "Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon’s Problem," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0418, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Parimal Kanti Bag; Hamid Sabourian, 2004. "Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon's Problem," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 257, Econometric Society.
   
   Published as:
   • Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid, 2005. "Distributing awards efficiently: More on King Solomon's problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 43-58, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Georgy Artemov, 2006. "Imminent Nash Implementation as a Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(14), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
   2. Mihara, H. Reiju, 2008. "The second-price auction solves King Solomon's dilemma," MPRA Paper 8801, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

2. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2000. "Law Enforcement Costs and Legal Presumptions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0194, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]

   Cited by:

   1. Alfredo Burlando & Alberto Motta, 2007. "Self Reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0063, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Motta, Alberto & Burlando, Alfredo, 2007. "Self reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," MPRA Paper 5332, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 19 Jan 2008. [Downloadable!]

3. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2000. "Strategic Information Revelation in Fund-Raising Campaigns," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0178, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]

   Cited by:

   1. Potters, J.J.M. & Shefton, M. & Vesterlund, L., 2003. "After you - endougenous sequencing in voluntary contribution games," Discussion Paper 98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Potters, Jan & Sefton, Martin & Vesterlund, Lise, 2005. "After you--endogenous sequencing in voluntary contribution games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1399-1419, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

4. Ruqu Wang & Parimal Kanti Bag & Emim Murat Dinlersoz, 1998. "More on Phantom Bidding," Working Papers 976, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

   Cited by:

   1. Takahiro Watanabe & Takehiko Yamato, 2008. "A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 57-80, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

1. ParimalKanti Bag & Santanu Roy, 2008. "Repeated Charitable Contributions under Incomplete Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 60-91, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Parimal Bag & Santanu Roy, 2008. "On Sequential and Simultaneous Contributions under Incomplete Information," Departmental Working Papers 0805, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2008. [Downloadable!]
   2. Kentaro Hatsumi, 2009. "A Coordination Game Model of Charitable Giving and Seed Money Effect," ISER Discussion Paper 0736, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
   3. Kentaro Hatsumi, 2009. "A Coordination Game Model of Charitable Giving and Seed Money Effect," ISER Discussion Paper 0736r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Sep 2009. [Downloadable!]

2. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid, 2005. "Distributing awards efficiently: More on King Solomon's problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 43-58, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Parimal Kanti Bag; Hamid Sabourian, 2004. "Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon's Problem," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 257, Econometric Society.
   • Bag, P.K. & Sabourian, H., 2004. "Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon’s Problem," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0418, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]

   See citations under working paper version above.

3. Bac, Mehmet & Bag, Parimal Kanti, 2001. "Law Enforcement and Legal Presumptions," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 722-748, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Gorkem Celik & Serdar Sayan, 2008. "On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 209-227, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

4. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Winter, Eyal, 1999. "Simple Subscription Mechanisms for Excludable Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 72-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Jordi Massó & Antonio Nicolò, 2007. "Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Gregarious Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 714.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Massó, Jordi & Nicolò, Antonio, 2008. "Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 591-611, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   2. MUTUSWAMI, Suresh & WINTER, Eyal, 2000. "Subscription mechanisms for network formation," CORE Discussion Papers 2000020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Mutuswami, Suresh & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 242-264, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      • Suresh Mutuswami & Eyal Winter, 2001. "Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation," Discussion Paper Series dp264, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
   3. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2000. "Strategic Information Revelation in Fund-Raising Campaigns," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0178, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
   4. Suresh Mutuswami & Eyal Winter, 2002. "Efficient Mechanisms for Multiple Public Goods," Discussion Paper Series dp314, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Mutuswami, Suresh & Winter, Eyal, 2004. "Efficient mechanisms for multiple public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 629-644, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   5. Suresh Mutuswami & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus: Realizing Efficient Outcomes in General Economic Environments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 479.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]

5. Bag, Parimal Kanti, 1997. "Optimal auction design and R&D," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(9), pages 1655-1674, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Johannes Münster, 2006. "Contests with Investment," Discussion Papers 120, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
   2. Johannes Münster, 2007. "Contests with investment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(8), pages 849-862. [Downloadable!]
   3. Veronika Grimm & Friederike Mengel & Giovanni Ponti & Lari Arthur Viianto, 2006. "Investment Incentives in Auctions: An Experiment," Working Paper Series in Economics 26, University of Cologne, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   4. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2003. "Optimal Design of Research Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 646-671, June. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2000. "Optimal Design of Research Contests," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1784, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]

6. Bag, Parimal Kanti, 1997. "Public Goods Provision: Applying Jackson-Moulin Mechanism for Restricted Agent Characteristics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 460-472, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2002. "Choosing Wisely: A Multibidding Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1577-1587, December. [Downloadable!]

7. Bag, Parimal Kanti, 1997. "Controlling Corruption in Hierarchies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 322-344, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Carolyn M. Warner, 2002. "Creating a Common Market for Fraud and Corruption in the European Union: an Institutional Accident, or a Deliberate Strategy?," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 31, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS). [Downloadable!]
   2. Amal Sanyal, 2000. "Bribes for Faster Delivery," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 474.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
   3. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2000. "Law Enforcement Costs and Legal Presumptions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0194, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]

8. Bag, Parimal Kanti, 1996. "Efficient Allocation of a "Pie": Divisible Case of King Solomon's Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 21-41, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Bag, P.K. & Sabourian, H., 2004. "Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon’s Problem," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0418, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Parimal Kanti Bag; Hamid Sabourian, 2004. "Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon's Problem," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 257, Econometric Society.
      • Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid, 2005. "Distributing awards efficiently: More on King Solomon's problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 43-58, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

This page was last updated on 2009-12-27.