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Citations of

Neil Rickman

Contents:

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

RePEc Biblio mentions

As found on the RePEc Biblio, the curated bibliography of Economics:
  1. Alan Collins & Guy Judge & Neil Rickman, 2007. "On the economics of plagiarism," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 93-107, October.

    Mentioned in:

    1. > Economics Profession > Ethics in Economics > Plagiarism

Wikipedia mentions

(Only mentions on Wikipedia that link back to a page on a RePEc service)
  1. Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Regulatory dealing - revisiting the Harrington paradox," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 361-378, June.

    Mentioned in:

    1. Harrinqton paradoksu in Wikipedia (Azerbaijani)
    2. Harrington paradox in Wikipedia (English)

Working papers

  1. Paul Levine & Klaus Moessner & Neil Rickman, 2007. "Spectrum Property Rights Versus a Commons Model: Exploitation of Mesh Networks," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0607, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

    Cited by:

    1. Arnon Tonmukayakul & Martin Weiss, 2008. "A study of secondary spectrum use using agent-based computational economics," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 125-151, October.

  2. Paul Levine & Neil Rickman & Francesc Trillas, 2006. "Price Regulation and the Commitment Problem: Can Limited Capture be Beneficial?," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0106, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

    Cited by:

    1. Joanne Evans & Paul Levine & Neil Rickman & Francesc Trillas, 2011. "Delegation to Independent Regulators and the Ratchet Effect," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0911, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

  3. Hawdon, David & Hunt, Lester & Levine, Paul L & Rickman, Neil, 2005. "Optimal Sliding Scale Regulation: An Application to Regional Electricity Distribution in England and Wales," CEPR Discussion Papers 4934, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Francesca Stroffolini, 2009. "Access Profit-Sharing Regulation with Information Transmission and Acquisition," CSEF Working Papers 214, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    2. Miraldo, Marisa & Siciliani, Luigi & Street, Andrew, 2011. "Price adjustment in the hospital sector," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 112-125, January.
    3. J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
    4. Stroffolini, Francesca, 2012. "Access profit-sharing regulation with information acquisition and transmission," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 161-174.

  4. Robert Witt & Neil Rickman, 2005. "Favouritism and financial incentives: A natural experiment," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0105, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

    Cited by:

    1. Andrés Picazo-Tadeo & Francisco Gónzalez-Gómez & Jorge Guardiola Wanden-Berghe, 2011. "Referee home bias due to social pressure. Evidence from Spanish football," Working Papers 1119, Department of Applied Economics II, Universidad de Valencia.
    2. Alex Bryson & Babatunde Buraimo & Rob Simmons, 2010. "Do Salaries Improve Worker Performance?," CEP Discussion Papers dp1019, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    3. Donna Harris & Benedikt Herrmann & Andreas Kontoleon, 2009. "`Two's Company, Three's a Group' The impact of group identity and group size on in-group favouritism," Discussion Papers 2009-13, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    4. Roberto Antonietti, 2008. "Il ruolo economico dell’arbitro di calcio: una rassegna della letteratura e alcune questioni aperte," Rivista di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport, Centro di diritto e business dello Sport, vol. 4(3), pages 75-103, Dicembre.
    5. Peter Dawson & Stephen Dobson, 2008. "The Influence of Social Pressure and Nationality on Individual Decisions: Evidence from the Behaviour of Referees," Working Papers 0809, International Association of Sports Economists & North American Association of Sports Economists.
    6. Dey, Oindrila & Banerjee, Swapnendu, 2013. "Status, incentives and random favouritism," MPRA Paper 49188, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Babatunde Buraimo & David Forrest & Robert Simmons, 2007. "The Twelfth Man? Refereeing Bias in English and German Soccer," Working Papers 0707, International Association of Sports Economists & North American Association of Sports Economists.
    8. Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo & Francisco González-Gómez & Jorge Guardiola, 2011. "The importance of time in referee home bias due to social pressure. Evidence from Spanish football," FEG Working Paper Series 03/11, Faculty of Economics and Business (University of Granada).
    9. Juan Mendoza & Andrés Rosas, 2013. "Referee Bias in Professional Soccer: Evidence from Colombia," VNIVERSITAS ECONÓMICA 011059, UNIVERSIDAD JAVERIANA - BOGOTÁ.
    10. Reilly, Barry & Witt, Robert, 2011. "Disciplinary sanctions in English Premiership Football: Is there a racial dimension?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 360-370, June.

  5. Neil Rickman & Robert Witt, 2003. "The determinants of employee crime in the UK," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0703, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

    Cited by:

    1. Seeun Jung & Kenneth Houngbedji, 2014. "Shirking, Monitoring, and Risk Aversion," PSE Working Papers halshs-00965532, HAL.
    2. Mark J. Garmaise & Tobias J. Moskowitz, 2004. "Bank Mergers and Crime: The Real and Social Effects of Credit Market Competition," NBER Working Papers 11006, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Cadsby C. Bram & Song Fei & Tapon Francis, 2010. "Are You Paying Your Employees to Cheat? An Experimental Investigation," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-32, April.
    4. Christian Almer & Timo Goeschl, 2010. "Environmental Crime and Punishment: Empirical Evidence from the German Penal Code," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 86(4), pages 707-726.

  6. Paul Levine & Neil Rickman, 2003. "Price Regulation, Investment and the Commitment Problem," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0603, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

    Cited by:

    1. Joanne Evans & Paul Levine & Fransesc Trillas, 2006. "Lobbies, Delegation and the Under-investment Problem in Regulation," School of Economics Discussion Papers 2006, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    2. Brito, Duarte & Pereira, Pedro & Vareda, João, 2011. "Investment, dynamic consistency and the sectoral regulator's obective," 8th Asia-Pacific Regional ITS Conference, Taipei 2011: Convergence in the Digital Age 52341, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    3. Maiorano, F. & Stern, J., 2007. "Institutions and investment in low and middle-income countries: the case of mobile communications," Working Papers 07/06, Department of Economics, City University London.
    4. Paul Levine & Neil Rickman & Francesc Trillas, 2006. "Price Regulation and the Commitment Problem: Can Limited Capture be Beneficial?," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0106, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    5. Paul Levine & Paul Levine & Jon Stern & Francesc Trillas, 2003. "Independent Utility Regulators: Lessons from Monetary Policy," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0403, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    6. Antonio Estache & L. Wren-Lewis, 2008. "Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Laffont's Lead," Working Papers ECARES 2008_018, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

  7. Leese, Robert & Paul Levine & Neil Rickman, 2002. "The Economic Effects of Spectrum Trading," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 123, Royal Economic Society.

    Cited by:

    1. Arnon Tonmukayakul & Martin Weiss, 2008. "A study of secondary spectrum use using agent-based computational economics," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 125-151, October.

  8. Currie, David & Levine, Paul L & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Delegation and the Ratchet Effect: Should Regulators Be Pro-Industry?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2274, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Levine, Paul L & Rickman, Neil, 2002. "Price Regulation, Investment and the Commitment Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 3200, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Stern, Jon & Trillas, Francesc, 2003. "Independence and discretion in telecommunications regulation: lessons from independent central banks," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 191-201, December.
    3. Paul Levine & Paul Levine & Jon Stern & Francesc Trillas, 2003. "Independent Utility Regulators: Lessons from Monetary Policy," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0403, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

  9. Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, . "Third Party Contingency contracts in settlement and litigation," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2002-1-1038, Berkeley Electronic Press.

    Cited by:

    1. Winand Emons, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0409, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    2. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0407, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    3. Roland Kirstein, 2009. "Optimal Delegation in Nash Bargaining," FEMM Working Papers 09001, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    4. Qiao, Yue, 2013. "Legal effort and optimal legal expenses insurance," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 179-189.
    5. Roland Kirstein, 2008. "Effizienzaspekte alternativer Streitbeilegung," FEMM Working Papers 08021, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    6. Roland Kirstein & Matthias Peiss, 2013. "Quantitative Machtkonzepte in der Ökonomik," FEMM Working Papers 130004, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    7. Emons, Winand, 2005. "Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Kirstein, Roland, 2004. "Anti-Teilen in Teams," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2004-04, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    9. Roland Kirstein & Annette Kirstein & Hans Gerhard, 2008. "The “Rainmaker’s Dilemma:” Bad Debt Loss Insurance in Settlement and Litigation," FEMM Working Papers 08002, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    10. Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2002. "Wozu Strafrecht? Another View of the Cathedral," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-14, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    11. Andrew Daughety & Jennifer Reinganum, 2013. "The effect of third-party funding of plaintiffs on settlement," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 13-00001, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    12. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2006. "US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(5), pages 379-385.

Articles

  1. Neil Rickman & Robert Witt, 2008. "Favouritism and Financial Incentives: A Natural Experiment," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(298), pages 296-309, 05.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Alan Collins & Guy Judge & Neil Rickman, 2007. "On the economics of plagiarism," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 93-107, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Burton, Michael & Rigby, Dan, 2012. "The Market for Essays," 2013 Conference (57th), February 5-8, 2013, Sydney, Australia 152195, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    2. Aurora A.C. Teixeira & Mariana Fontes da Costa, 2010. "Who rules the ruler? On the misconduct of Journal Editors," OBEGEF Working Papers 005, OBEGEF - Observatório de Economia e Gestão de Fraude & OBEGEF Working Papers on Fraud and Corruption.
    3. Guy Judge, 2008. "Plagiarism: Bringing Economics and Education Together (With a Little Help from IT)," Computers in Higher Education Economics Review, Economics Network, University of Bristol, vol. 20(1), pages 21-26.

  3. Paul Fenn & Alastair Gray & Neil Rickman, 2007. "Standard fees for legal aid: an empirical analysis of incentives and contracts," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 662-681, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Stephen, Frank H. & Fazio, Giorgio & Tata, Cyrus, 2008. "Incentives, criminal defence lawyers and plea bargaining," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 212-219, September.

  4. Fenn, Paul & Gray, Alastair & Rickman, Neil, 2007. "Liability, insurance and medical practice," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 1057-1070, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Sofia, AmaralGarcia & Veronica, Grembi, 2011. "Curb your premium! evaluating state intervention in medical malpractice insurance," MPRA Paper 32301, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  5. Neil Rickman & Robert Witt, 2007. "The Determinants of Employee Crime in the UK," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(293), pages 161-175, 02.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. David Hawdon & Lester C. Hunt & Paul Levine & Neil Rickman, 2007. "Optimal sliding scale regulation: an application to regional electricity distribution in England and Wales," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 458-485, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil & Tzavara, Dionisia, 2004. "Legal expenses insurance, risk aversion and litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 107-119, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 2007. "Contingent fees versus legal expenses insurance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 351-361, September.
    2. Qiao, Yue, 2013. "Legal effort and optimal legal expenses insurance," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 179-189.

  8. Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, 2004. ""Third Party Contingency" Contracts in Settlement and Litigation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(4), pages 555-, December.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  9. Paul Fenn & Alastair Gray & Neil Rickman, 2004. "The Economics of Clinical Negligence Reform in England," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(496), pages F272-F292, 06.

    Cited by:

    1. Amaral-Garcia, Sofia & Grembi, Veronica, 2014. "Curb your premium: The impact of monitoring malpractice claims," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 139-146.
    2. Sofia, AmaralGarcia & Veronica, Grembi, 2011. "Curb your premium! evaluating state intervention in medical malpractice insurance," MPRA Paper 32301, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Feess, Eberhard & Ossig, Sonja, 2007. "Reimbursement schemes for hospitals, malpractice liability, and intrinsic motivation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 423-441, December.
    4. Fenn, Paul & Gray, Alastair & Rickman, Neil, 2007. "Liability, insurance and medical practice," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 1057-1070, September.

  10. Rickman, Neil & McGuire, Alistair, 1999. "Regulating Providers' Reimbursement in a Mixed Market for Health Care," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 46(1), pages 53-71, February.

    Cited by:

    1. González, Paula & Macho-Stadler, Inés, 2013. "A theoretical approach to dual practice regulations in the health sector," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 66-87.
    2. Paula González, 2004. "Should physicians' dual practice be limited? An incentive approach," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(6), pages 505-524.
    3. Kurt R. Brekke & Lars Sørgard, 2006. "Public versus Private Health Care in a National Health Service," CESifo Working Paper Series 1679, CESifo Group Munich.
    4. Schuster, Stephan, 2012. "Applications in Agent-Based Computational Economics," MPRA Paper 47201, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Socha, Karolina, 2010. "Physician dual practice and the public health care provision. Review of the literature," COHERE Working Paper 2010:4, COHERE - Centre of Health Economics Research, University of Southern Denmark.
    6. Paula González, 2005. "On a policy of transferring public patients to private practice," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(5), pages 513-527.
    7. Socha, Karolina Z. & Bech, Mickael, 2011. "Physician dual practice: A review of literature," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 1-7, September.
    8. Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka & Carol Propper, 2012. "Competition, Equity and Quality in Health CareAbstract: In this paper we focus on the implications of consumer heterogeneity for whether competition will improve outcomes in health care markets. We sh," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 12/296, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.

  11. Fenn, Paul & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Delay and Settlement in Litigation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(457), pages 476-91, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Graevenitz, Georg von, 2007. "Which Reputations Does a Brand Owner Need? Evidence from Trade Mark Opposition," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 215, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    2. Yasutora Watanabe, 2005. "Learning and Bargaining in Dispute Resolution: Theory and Evidence from Medical Malpractice Litigation," 2005 Meeting Papers 440, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. van Velthoven, Ben & van Wijck, Peter, 2001. "Legal cost insurance and social welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 387-396, September.
    4. Davis S. Kaplan & Joyce Sadka & Jorge Luis Silva-Mendez, 2006. "Litigation and Settlement: New Evidence from Labor Courts in Mexico," Working Papers 0606, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    5. Lode Vereeck & Manuela Mühl, 2000. "An Economic Theory of Court Delay," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 243-268, November.
    6. Kaplan, David S. & Sadka, Joyce, 2008. "Enforceability of labor law : evidence from a labor court in Mexico," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4483, The World Bank.
    7. J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier & Albert Yoon, 2014. "Trial and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements," NBER Working Papers 19873, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Neil Rickman & Paul Fenn & Alastair Gray, 1999. "The reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 20(3), pages 261-286, September.
    9. Di Vita, Giuseppe, 2010. "Production of laws and delays in court decisions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 276-281, September.
    10. Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil & Tzavara, Dionisia, 2004. "Legal expenses insurance, risk aversion and litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 107-119, March.
    11. Ormosi, Peter L., 2012. "Tactical dilatory practice in litigation: Evidence from EC merger proceedings," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 370-377.

  12. Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Regulatory dealing - revisiting the Harrington paradox," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 361-378, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Heather Eckert & Andrew Eckert, 2010. "The geographic distribution of environmental inspections," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 1-22, February.
    2. Blackman, Allen & Harrington, Winston, 1999. "The Use of Economic Incentives in Developing Countries: Lessons from International Experience with Industrial Air Pollution," Discussion Papers dp-99-39, Resources For the Future.
    3. Nyborg, Karine & Telle, Kjetil, 2004. "The role of warnings in regulation: keeping control with less punishment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2801-2816, December.
    4. Häckner, Jonas & Herzing, Mathias, 2012. "When do Firms Break the Law in Order to Reduce Marginal Cost? - An Application to the Problem of Environmental Inspection," Research Papers in Economics 2012:11, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    5. Arun Malik, 2007. "The Desirability of Forgiveness in Regulatory Enforcement," Working Papers 2008-14, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    6. Timo Goeschl & Ole Jürgens, 2012. "Environmental quality and welfare effects of improving the reporting capability of citizen monitoring schemes," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 264-286, December.
    7. Anna Rita Germani, 2007. "The Environmental Enforcement in the Civil and the Common Law Systems. A Case on the Economic Effects of Legal Institutions," Quaderni DSEMS 22-2007, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
    8. Germani, Anna Rita & Morone, Andrea & Morone, Piergiuseppe & Scaramozzino, Pasquale, 2013. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between firms, regulatory agency and justice department: a theoretical and empirical investigation," MPRA Paper 51369, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Cory, Dennis C. & Rahman, Tauhidur, 2009. "Environmental justice and enforcement of the safe drinking water act: The Arizona arsenic experience," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(6), pages 1825-1837, April.
    10. Nøstbakken, Linda, 2008. "Fisheries law enforcement--A survey of the economic literature," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 293-300, May.
    11. Timo Goeschl & Ole Jürgens, 2014. "Criminalizing environmental offences: when the prosecutor’s helping hand hurts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 199-219, April.
    12. Christian Langpap, 2007. "Pollution abatement with limited enforcement power and citizen suits," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 57-81, February.
    13. Decker, Christopher S. & Pope, Christopher R., 2005. "Adherence to environmental law: the strategic complementarities of compliance decisions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-5), pages 641-661, September.
    14. Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2012. "Learning about compliance under asymmetric information," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 55-73.
    15. Marcello Basili & Filippo Belloc & Simona Benedettini & Antonio Nicita, 2012. "Warning, Learning and Compliance: Evidence from Micro-data on Driving Behavior," Department of Economics University of Siena 639, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    16. Langpap, Christian & Shimshack, Jay P., 2010. "Private citizen suits and public enforcement: Substitutes or complements?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 235-249, May.
    17. Goeschl, Timo & Jürgens, Ole, 2012. "Explaining uniformity in rule design: The role of citizen participation in enforcement," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 166-177.
    18. Takayoshi Shinkuma & Shunsuke Managi, 2012. "Effectiveness of policy against illegal disposal of waste," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(2), pages 123-145, April.
    19. Christian Langpap, 2008. "Self-Reporting and Private Enforcement in Environmental Regulation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(4), pages 489-506, August.
    20. Sandra Rousseau, 2007. "Timing of environmental inspections: survival of the compliant," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 17-36, August.
    21. Nyborg, Karine & Telle, Kjetil, 2004. "A dissolving paradox: Firms’ compliance to environmental regulation," Memorandum 02/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    22. Helfand, Gloria E. & Berck, Peter & Maull, Tim, 2003. "The theory of pollution policy," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 249-303 Elsevier.

  13. Neil Rickman & Paul Fenn & Alastair Gray, 1999. "The reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 20(3), pages 261-286, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Kirstein, Roland & Rickman, Neil, 2003. ""Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2003-09, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    2. Kirstein, Roland & Rickman, Neil, 2001. "FORIS contracts: Litigation Cost Shifting and Contingent Fees in Germany," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2001-04, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.

  14. Gray, Alastair & Rickman, Neil & Fenn, Paul, 1999. "Professional Autonomy and the Cost of Legal Aid," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 545-58, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Antony Dnes & Neil Rickman, 1998. "Contracts for Legal Aid: A Critical Discussion of Government Policy Proposals," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 247-265, May.
    2. Qiao, Yue, 2013. "Legal effort and optimal legal expenses insurance," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 179-189.
    3. Robert Witt & Neil Rickman, 2005. "Favouritism and financial incentives: A natural experiment," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0105, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    4. Stephen, Frank H. & Fazio, Giorgio & Tata, Cyrus, 2008. "Incentives, criminal defence lawyers and plea bargaining," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 212-219, September.

  15. Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Contingent fees and litigation settlement1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 295-317, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Emons, Winand & Garoupa, Nuno, 2004. "The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4473, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 2007. "Contingent fees versus legal expenses insurance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 351-361, September.
    3. Hyde, Charles E., 2006. "Conditional versus contingent fees: Litigation expenditure incentives," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 180-194, June.
    4. Winand Emons, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0409, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    5. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2001. "A Note on Settlements under the Contingent Fee Method of Compensating Lawyers," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt2vz8x310, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    6. Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez, 2002. "Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees," Economics Working Papers 639, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    7. Emons, Winand, 2000. "Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 21-33, March.
    8. Kirstein, Roland & Rickman, Neil, 2001. "FORIS contracts: Litigation Cost Shifting and Contingent Fees in Germany," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2001-04, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    9. Douglas Cumming, 2001. "Settlement Disputes: Evidence from a Legal Practice Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 249-280, May.
    10. Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, 2004. ""Third Party Contingency" Contracts in Settlement and Litigation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(4), pages 555-, December.
    11. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2002. "A note on settlements under the contingent fee method of compensating lawyers," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 217-225, August.

  16. Antony Dnes & Neil Rickman, 1998. "Contracts for Legal Aid: A Critical Discussion of Government Policy Proposals," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 247-265, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Neil Rickman & Paul Fenn & Alastair Gray, 1999. "The reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 20(3), pages 261-286, September.

  17. Neil Rickman & Paul Fenn, 1998. "Insuring Litigation Risk: Some Recent Developments in England and Wales*," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(2), pages 210-223, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Brian G Main & Alan Peacock, 1998. "What price civil justice?," ESE Discussion Papers 6, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.

  18. Roger Bowles & Neil Rickman, 1998. "Asymmetric Information, Moral Hazard and the Insurance of Legal Expenses*," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(2), pages 196-209, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Qiao, Yue, 2013. "Legal effort and optimal legal expenses insurance," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 179-189.

  19. Fenn, Paul & Rickman, Neil & McGuire, Alistair, 1994. "Contracts and supply assurance in the UK health care market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 125-144, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Martin Chalkley & Duncan McVicar, 2007. "Choice of Contracts in the British National Health Service: An Empirical Study," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 216, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
    2. Chalkley, M. & Malcomson, J.M., 1995. "Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9514, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    3. Antony Dnes & Neil Rickman, 1998. "Contracts for Legal Aid: A Critical Discussion of Government Policy Proposals," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 247-265, May.
    4. Csaba, Ivan & Fenn, Paul, 1997. "Contractual choice in the managed health care market An empirical analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 579-588, October.
    5. Lise Rochaix, 1997. "Asymétries d'information et incertitude en santé : les apports de la théorie des contrats," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 129(3), pages 11-24.
    6. De Fraja, Gianni, 2000. "Contracts for health care and asymmetric information," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 663-677, September.
    7. Eleonora Fichera & Hugh Gravelle & Mario Pezzino & Matt Sutton, 2013. "Choice of contracts for quality in health care: Evidence from the British NHS," Working Papers 085cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.

  20. Rickman, Neil, 1994. "The Economics of Contingency Fees in Personal Injury Litigation," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 34-50, Spring.

    Cited by:

    1. Winand Emons, 2007. "Conditional versus contingent fees," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 89-101, January.
    2. Kirstein, Roland & Rickman, Neil, 2003. ""Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2003-09, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    3. Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2013. "The regulation of quality in the market for legal services: Taking the heterogeneity of legal services seriously," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 10(2), pages 267-291, August.
    4. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0407, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    5. Neil Rickman & Paul Fenn & Alastair Gray, 1999. "The reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 20(3), pages 261-286, September.
    6. Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil & Tzavara, Dionisia, 2004. "Legal expenses insurance, risk aversion and litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 107-119, March.
    7. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2011. "The case against lawyers’ contingent fees and the misapplication of principal-agent models," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 263-292, October.

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