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Citations of
H. Reiju Mihara

For current contact information and a more complete listing of works, please see here

The citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.

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Working papers

  1. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2007. "Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core," MPRA Paper 437, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2007. "The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games," MPRA Paper 3684, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2007. "Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities," MPRA Paper 440, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    3. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2008. "Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction," MPRA Paper 11728, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

  2. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2007. "The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games," MPRA Paper 3684, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2008. "Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction," MPRA Paper 11728, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

  3. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2007. "Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities," MPRA Paper 440, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2007. "The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games," MPRA Paper 3684, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  4. H. Reiju Mihara, 2003. "Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games," Game Theory and Information 0310006, EconWPA, revised 01 Jun 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2007. "Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities," MPRA Paper 440, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    2. Masahiro Kumabe & H. Reiju Mihara, 2008. "The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 621-640, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:

  5. H. Reiju Mihara, 1997. "Arrow's Theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators," Public Economics 9705001, EconWPA, revised 07 May 1997. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. H. Reiju Mihara, 2003. "Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games," Game Theory and Information 0310006, EconWPA, revised 01 Jun 2004. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Norbert Brunner & H. Reiju Mihara, 1999. "Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice," Public Economics 9902001, EconWPA, revised 01 Jun 2004. [Downloadable!]
    3. Potgieter, Petrus H. & Rosinger, Elemér E., 2007. "Is Economics Entering its Post-Witchcraft Era?," MPRA Paper 3340, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]

  6. H. Reiju Mihara, 1996. "Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives," Public Economics 9604003, EconWPA, revised 24 Apr 1996. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Chun-Hsien Yeh, 2008. "An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 575-583, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    2. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2008. "Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction," MPRA Paper 11728, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

  7. H. Reiju Mihara, 1996. "Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof," Public Economics 9604002, EconWPA, revised 20 Sep 1996. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Norbert Brunner & H. Reiju Mihara, 1999. "Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice," Public Economics 9902001, EconWPA, revised 01 Jun 2004. [Downloadable!]
    2. H. Reiju Mihara, 1997. "Arrow's Theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators," Public Economics 9705001, EconWPA, revised 07 May 1997. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. H. Reiju Mihara, 1994. "Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability," Public Economics 9408001, EconWPA, revised 23 Aug 1994. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  8. H. Reiju Mihara, 1994. "Anonymity and Neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with Restricted Coalition Algebras," Public Economics 9411001, EconWPA, revised 22 Nov 1994. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. H. Reiju Mihara, 2003. "Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games," Game Theory and Information 0310006, EconWPA, revised 01 Jun 2004. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Andrei Gomberg & Cesar Martinelli & Ricard Torres, 2002. "Anonymity in Large Societies," Working Papers 0211, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Norbert Brunner & H. Reiju Mihara, 1999. "Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice," Public Economics 9902001, EconWPA, revised 01 Jun 2004. [Downloadable!]
    4. H. Reiju Mihara, 1994. "Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability," Public Economics 9408001, EconWPA, revised 23 Aug 1994. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  9. Mihara, H.R., 1994. "Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability," Papers 276, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
    Other versions:

    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2009. "On the computability of quasi-transitive binary social choice rules in an infinite society and the halting problem," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 67-78, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    2. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2007. "The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games," MPRA Paper 3684, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. H. Reiju Mihara, 2003. "Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games," Game Theory and Information 0310006, EconWPA, revised 01 Jun 2004. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2007. "Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities," MPRA Paper 440, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    5. Andrei Gomberg & Cesar Martinelli & Ricard Torres, 2002. "Anonymity in Large Societies," Working Papers 0211, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    6. Norbert Brunner & H. Reiju Mihara, 1999. "Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice," Public Economics 9902001, EconWPA, revised 01 Jun 2004. [Downloadable!]
    7. H. Reiju Mihara, 1997. "Arrow's Theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators," Public Economics 9705001, EconWPA, revised 07 May 1997. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    8. Hannu Salonen & Kari Saukkonen, 2005. "On continuity of Arrovian social welfare functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 85-93, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)


Articles

  1. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2008. "Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3-4), pages 348-366, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  2. Masahiro Kumabe & H. Reiju Mihara, 2008. "The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 621-640, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  3. Mihara, H. Reiju, 2004. "Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 329-341, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  4. H. Reiju Mihara, 2001. "Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 543-553. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  5. H. Reiju Mihara, 2000. "Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 393-402. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  6. Mihara, H. Reiju, 1999. "Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators1," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 267-287, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  7. H. Reiju Mihara, 1997. "Arrow's Theorem and Turing computability," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 257-276. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  8. H. Reiju Mihara, 1997. "Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 503-512. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.


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This page was last updated on 2010-1-1.


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