Citations of
David A. Miller

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Working papers

1. David A. Miller, 2005. "Invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry," Industrial Organization 0510001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   Published as:
   • Miller, David A., 2008. "Invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 387-412, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Luis Cabral & Ben Polak, 2007. "Dominant Firms, Imitation, and Incentives to Innovate," Working Papers 07-6, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

2. David A. Miller, 2005. "The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information," Game Theory and Information 0510002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

   Cited by:

   1. Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2005. "Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production," Research Papers 1887, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007. "Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1794-1823, December. [Downloadable!]
      • Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2004. "Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production," 2004 Meeting Papers 418, Society for Economic Dynamics.
   2. Alberto Martin & Wouter Vergote, 2005. "On the Role of Retaliation in Trade Agreements," Economics Working Papers 914, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2008. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • MARTIN, Alberto & VERGOTE, Wouter, 2007. "On the role of retaliation in trade agreements," CORE Discussion Papers 2007089, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
      • Martin, Alberto & Vergote, Wouter, 2008. "On the role of retaliation in trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 61-77, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   3. Susan Athey & Ilya Segal, 2007. "An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001134, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   4. Martin, Alberto & Vergote, Wouter, 2004. "Antidumping: Welfare Enhancing Retaliation?," MPRA Paper 5416, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

1. Miller, David A., 2008. "Invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 387-412, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • David A. Miller, 2005. "Invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry," Industrial Organization 0510001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

   See citations under working paper version above.

2. Goldfarb, Brent & Kirsch, David & Miller, David A., 2007. "Was there too little entry during the Dot Com Era?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 100-144, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Sorensen, Morten, 2007. "Learning by Investing: Evidence from Venture Capital," SIFR Research Report Series 53, Institute for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
   2. Boyan Jovanovic & Balà zs Szentes, 2007. "On the Return to Venture Capital," NBER Working Papers 12874, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

This page was last updated on 2009-11-10.