Citations of
Johan N. M. Lagerlof

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Working papers

1. Lagerlöf, Johan N.M. & Seltzer, Andrew J, 2008. "The Effects of Remedial Mathematics on the Learning of Economics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 6895, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Juan J. Dolado & Eduardo Morales, 2009. "Which factors determine academic performance of Economics freshers? Some Spanish evidence," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 33(2), pages 179-210, May. [Downloadable!]

2. Lars Frisell & Johan N.M. Lagerlof, 2005. "Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favor of Price Regulations," Industrial Organization 0510011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Frisell, Lars & Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2005. "Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favour of Price Regulations," CEPR Discussion Papers 5343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Lars Frisell & Johann Lagerloef, 2005. "Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favor of Price Regulations," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 05/10, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Aug 2005. [Downloadable!]

   Cited by:

   1. Priyodorshi Banerjee, 2007. "Price Interventions in a Cournot Oligopoly with a Dominant Firm," Topics in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1348-1348. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

3. Johan Lagerlof, 2003. "Insisting on a Non-Negative Price: Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Welfare, and Multiple Equilibria," Industrial Organization 0304007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Johan Lagerlöf, 2003. "Insisting on a Non-Negative Price: Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Welfare, and Multiple Equilibria," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-04, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
   • Johan Lagerlof, 2003. "Insisting on a Non-Negative Price: Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Welfare, and Multiple Equilibria," Microeconomics 0304006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2003. "Insisting on a Non-negative Price: Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Welfare and Multiple Equilibria," CEPR Discussion Papers 3901, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   
   Published as:
   • Lagerlof, Johan N.M., 2007. "Insisting on a non-negative price: Oligopoly, uncertainty, welfare, and multiple equilibria," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 861-875, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Johan Lagerlöf, 2006. "Equilibrium Uniqueness in a Cournot Model with Demand Uncertainty," Topics in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 6(1), pages 1333-1333. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

4. Johan Lagerlöf & Paul Heidhues, 2002. "On the Desirability of an Efficeincy Defense in Merger Control," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-08, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Johan N. M. Lagerlöf & Paul Heidhues, 2004. "On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/24, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
   • Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2003. "On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 3841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   
   Published as:
   • Lagerlof, Johan N.M. & Heidhues, Paul, 2005. "On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 803-827, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Oliver Gürtler & Matthias Kräkel, 2006. "Mergers, Litigation and Efficiency," Discussion Papers 185, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
   2. Andreea Cosnita & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2006. "On the effective design of the efficiency defence," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v06030, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Andreea Cosnita & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2006. "On the Effective Design of the Efficiency Defence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00113503_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
   3. Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer, 2006. "Assessing Horizontal Mergers under Uncertain Efficiency Gains," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Choné, Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent, 2008. "Assessing horizontal mergers under uncertain efficiency gains," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 913-929, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      • Philippe Choné ; Laurent Linnemer, 2006. "Assessing Horizontal Mergers under Uncertain Efficiency Gains," Working Papers 2006-06, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique, revised Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
   4. Chongwoo, Choe & Shekhar, Chander, 2009. "Compulsory or Voluntary Pre-merger Notification? Theory and Some Evidence," MPRA Paper 13450, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Chongwoo Choe & Chander Shekhar, 2008. "Compulsory Or Voluntary Pre-Merger Notification? Theory And Some Evidence," Monash Economics Working Papers 20/08, Monash University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   5. Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2006. "A Theory of Rent Seeking with Informational Foundations," CEPR Discussion Papers 5893, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
      • Johan N.M. Lagerlöf, 2006. "A Theory of Rent Seeking with Informational Foundations," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 06/04, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
      • Johan Lagerlöf, 2007. "A theory of rent seeking with informational foundations," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 197-218, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   6. Goppelsroeder, M. & Schinkel, M.P. & Tuinstra, J., 2006. "Quantifying the Scope for Efficiency Defense in Merger Control: The Werden-Froeb-Index," CeNDEF Working Papers 06-09, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]

5. Johan Lagerlof, 2002. "Efficiency-Enhancing Signalling in the Samaritan's Dilemma," Microeconomics 0207001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2003. "Efficiency-Enhancing Signalling in the Samaritan's Dilemma," CEPR Discussion Papers 3842, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   
   Published as:
   • Johan Lagerl–f, 2004. "Efficiency-enhancing signalling in the Samaritan's dilemma," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(492), pages 55-69, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2009. "Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan's Dilemma," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   2. Amegashie, J.A., 2006. "Economics, Gratitude, and Warm-Glow," Working Papers 2006-1, University of Guelph, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   3. Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2003. "Efficiency-Enhancing Signalling in the Samaritan's Dilemma," CEPR Discussion Papers 3842, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
      • Johan Lagerl–f, 2004. "Efficiency-enhancing signalling in the Samaritan's dilemma," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(492), pages 55-69, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      • Johan Lagerlof, 2002. "Efficiency-Enhancing Signalling in the Samaritan's Dilemma," Microeconomics 0207001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

6. Johan Lagerlof, 2002. "Are We Better Off If Our Politicians Have More Information?," Public Economics 0209001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2003. "Are we Better Off if our Politicians Have More Information?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3884, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   
   Published as:
   • Johan Lagerl–f, 2004. "Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 106(1), pages 123-142, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Catherine C. Eckel & Ragan Petrie, 2008. "Face Value," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2008-11, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]

7. Paul Heidhues & Johan Lagerlöf, 2000. "Hiding Information in Electoral Competition," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-06, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Feb 2002. [Downloadable!]
   Published as:
   • Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlof, Johan, 2003. "Hiding information in electoral competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 48-74, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Aleksander Berentsen & Esther Bruegger & Simon Loertscher, 2008. "Learning, public good provision, and the information trap," IEW - Working Papers iewwp371, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Berentsen, Aleksander & Bruegger, Esther & Loertscher, Simon, 2008. "Learning, public good provision, and the information trap," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 998-1010, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   2. Frisell, Lars, 2004. "Populism," Working Paper Series 166, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden). [Downloadable!]
   3. Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sorensen, 2002. "Professional Advice: The Theory of Reputational Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 02-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   4. Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2002. "The Dark Side of Competitive Pressure," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 02/3, Hunter College: Department of Economics, revised 2002. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2002. "The dark side of competitive pressure," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2002-43, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
      • Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2005. "The Dark Side of Competitive Pressure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 361-397, Summer.
   5. Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2003. "Are we Better Off if our Politicians Have More Information?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3884, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
      • Johan Lagerlof, 2002. "Are We Better Off If Our Politicians Have More Information?," Public Economics 0209001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
      • Johan Lagerl–f, 2004. "Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 106(1), pages 123-142, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   6. Santiago Sanchez-Pages & Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "An Experimental Study of Truth-Telling in a Sender-Receiver Game," ESE Discussion Papers 128, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Sanchez-Pages, Santiago & Vorsatz, Marc, 2007. "An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 86-112, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   7. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse Shapiro, 2005. "Media Bias and Reputation," NBER Working Papers 11664, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
      • Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2006. "Media Bias and Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 280-316, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   8. Ingmar Nyman & Jason G. Cummins, 2007. "“Yes-Men in Tournaments," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 417, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   9. Ingmar Nyman & Jason G. Cummins, 2005. "Information Management in Rank-Order Tournaments," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 413, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

1. Lars Frisell & Johan N. M. Lagerlöf, 2007. "A Model of Reputation in Cheap Talk," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 109(1), pages 49-70, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2006. "A Theory of Rent Seeking with Informational Foundations," CEPR Discussion Papers 5893, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
      • Johan N.M. Lagerlöf, 2006. "A Theory of Rent Seeking with Informational Foundations," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 06/04, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
      • Johan Lagerlöf, 2007. "A theory of rent seeking with informational foundations," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 197-218, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

2. Lagerlof, Johan N.M., 2007. "Insisting on a non-negative price: Oligopoly, uncertainty, welfare, and multiple equilibria," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 861-875, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Johan Lagerlof, 2003. "Insisting on a Non-Negative Price: Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Welfare, and Multiple Equilibria," Industrial Organization 0304007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Johan Lagerlöf, 2003. "Insisting on a Non-Negative Price: Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Welfare, and Multiple Equilibria," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-04, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
   • Johan Lagerlof, 2003. "Insisting on a Non-Negative Price: Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Welfare, and Multiple Equilibria," Microeconomics 0304006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2003. "Insisting on a Non-negative Price: Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Welfare and Multiple Equilibria," CEPR Discussion Papers 3901, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   See citations under working paper version above.

3. Lagerlof, Johan N.M. & Heidhues, Paul, 2005. "On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 803-827, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Johan N. M. Lagerlöf & Paul Heidhues, 2004. "On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/24, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
   • Johan Lagerlöf & Paul Heidhues, 2002. "On the Desirability of an Efficeincy Defense in Merger Control," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-08, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
   • Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2003. "On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 3841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   See citations under working paper version above.

4. Johan Lagerl–f, 2004. "Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 106(1), pages 123-142, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2003. "Are we Better Off if our Politicians Have More Information?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3884, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Johan Lagerlof, 2002. "Are We Better Off If Our Politicians Have More Information?," Public Economics 0209001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

   See citations under working paper version above.

5. Johan Lagerl–f, 2004. "Efficiency-enhancing signalling in the Samaritan's dilemma," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(492), pages 55-69, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Johan Lagerlof, 2002. "Efficiency-Enhancing Signalling in the Samaritan's Dilemma," Microeconomics 0207001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2003. "Efficiency-Enhancing Signalling in the Samaritan's Dilemma," CEPR Discussion Papers 3842, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   See citations under working paper version above.

6. Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlof, Johan, 2003. "Hiding information in electoral competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 48-74, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Paul Heidhues & Johan Lagerlöf, 2000. "Hiding Information in Electoral Competition," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-06, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Feb 2002. [Downloadable!]

   See citations under working paper version above.

7. Lagerlof, Johan, 1997. "Lobbying, information, and private and social welfare," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 615-637, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Frisell, Lars & Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2004. "Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation," CEPR Discussion Papers 4313, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
      • Johan Lagerlöf & Lars Frisell, 2004. "Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation," CIG Working Papers SP II 2004-02, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
      • Johan Lagerlof & Lars Frisell, 2004. "Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation," Microeconomics 0402013, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
      • Johan Lagerlof & Lars Frisell, 2004. "Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation," Public Economics 0402003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

This page was last updated on 2009-11-5.