Citations of
Bruce Harold Kobayashi

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1. Froeb, Luke M. & Kobayashi, Bruce H., 2001. "Evidence production in adversarial vs. inquisitorial regimes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 267-272, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Jesse Bull, 2006. "Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability," Working Papers 0611, Florida International University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Jesse Bull, 2008. "Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability," Topics in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 8(1), pages 1336-1336. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   2. Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2005. "The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony," CEPR Discussion Papers 5124, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
      • Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2005. "The Optimal Amount of Falsfied Testimony," Diskussionsschriften dp0506, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
      • Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2005. "The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony," Cahiers de recherche 0520, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
   3. Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2003. "On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 3841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
      • Lagerlof, Johan N.M. & Heidhues, Paul, 2005. "On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 803-827, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      • Johan Lagerlöf & Paul Heidhues, 2002. "On the Desirability of an Efficeincy Defense in Merger Control," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-08, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
      • Johan N. M. Lagerlöf & Paul Heidhues, 2004. "On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/24, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
   4. Bruno Deffains & Yannick Gabuthy & Eve-Angéline Lambert, 2007. "Labor Conflicts and Inefficiency of Relationship-Specific Investments: What is the Judge's Role?," Working Papers of BETA 2007-04, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
   5. Jesse Bull, 2006. "Costly Evidence and Systems of Fact Finding," Working Papers 0612, Florida International University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Jesse Bull, 2009. "Costly Evidence And Systems Of Fact-Finding," Bulletin of Economic Research, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(2), pages 103-125, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   6. Nuno Garoupa, 2008. "Some reflections on the economics of prosecutors: Mandatory v selective prosecution," Working Papers 2008-04, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Garoupa, Nuno, 2009. "Some reflections on the economics of prosecutors: Mandatory vs. selective prosecution," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-28, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   7. C. Manuel Willington, 2004. "Hold-Up under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 231, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • C. Manuel Willington, . "Hold-Up under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv144, Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines. [Downloadable!]
   8. Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures," Cahiers de recherche 0703, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Claude Fluet, 2009. "Accuracy Versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 134-156, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      • Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures," Diskussionsschriften dp0702, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
      • Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2007. "Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures," CEPR Discussion Papers 6150, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   9. Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-32, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," MPRA Paper 8995, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

2. Kobayashi, Bruce H. & Lott, John Jr., 1996. "In defense of criminal defense expenditures and plea bargaining," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 397-416, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Zhou, J., 2007. "In Litigation: How Far do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead?," Discussion Paper 2007-002, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
   2. Nuno Garoupa & Hugh Gravelle, . "Does Efficient Deterrence Require that the Wealthy Should Be Able to Buy Justice?," Discussion Papers 00/07, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
   3. Andrew Dyke, 2007. "Electoral cycles in the administration of criminal justice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 417-437, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   4. Jack Hirshleifer & Evan Osborne, 1999. "Truth and the Legal Battle," UCLA Economics Working Papers 790, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

3. Ribstein, Larry E & Kobayashi, Bruce H, 1996. "An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 131-99, January.

   Cited by:

   1. Francisco Garcimartín Alférez, 1999. "Regulatory Competition: A Private International Law Approach," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 251-270, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   2. Garoupa, Nuno & Ogus, Anthony, 2003. "A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants," CEPR Discussion Papers 4123, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
      • Nuno Garoupa & Anthony Ogus, 2006. "A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35, pages 339-363. [Downloadable!]

4. Kobayashi, Bruce H & Ribstein, Larry E, 1996. "Evolution and Spontaneous Uniformity: Evidence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability Company," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(3), pages 464-83, July.

   Cited by:

   1. Klaus Heine & Wolfgang Kerber, 2002. "European Corporate Laws, Regulatory Competition and Path Dependence," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 47-71, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

5. Froeb, Luke M & Kobayashi, Bruce H, 1996. "Naive, Biased, Yet Bayesian: Can Juries Interpret Selectively Produced Evidence?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 257-76, April.

   Cited by:

   1. Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2008. "Persuasion as a Contest," Economics Series 2008_07, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Skaperdas, Stergios / Vaidya, Samarth, 2007. "Persuasion as a Contest," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
      • Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2007. "Persuasion as a Contest," Working Papers 070809, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   2. Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2005. "The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony," CEPR Discussion Papers 5124, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
      • Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2005. "The Optimal Amount of Falsfied Testimony," Diskussionsschriften dp0506, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
      • Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2005. "The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony," Cahiers de recherche 0520, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
   3. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2002. "Preponderance of Evidence," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-61, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude, 2006. "Preponderance of evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 963-976, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      • Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude, 2002. "Preponderance of Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
      • Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2002. "Preponderance of Evidence," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 150, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
   4. David M Levy & Sandra J Peart, 2008. "Inducing Greater Transparency: Towards the Establishment of Ethical Rules for Econometrics," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 34(1), pages 103-114, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   5. Anabela Botelho, 2001. "Strategic behavior at trial-The production, reporting, and evaluation of complex evidence," Working Papers 14, Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada (NIMA), Universidade do Minho. [Downloadable!]
   6. Chris William Sanchirico, 2004. "Relying on the Information of Interested--and Potentially Dishonest--Parties," Law and Economics 0403001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   7. Chris William Sanchirico, 2004. "Games, Information, and Evidence Production: With Application to English Legal History," Law and Economics 0403002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   8. Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures," Cahiers de recherche 0703, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Claude Fluet, 2009. "Accuracy Versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 134-156, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      • Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures," Diskussionsschriften dp0702, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
      • Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2007. "Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures," CEPR Discussion Papers 6150, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   9. Claude Fluet, 2002. "Enforcing Contracts: Should Courts Seek the Truth?," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-76, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Claude Fluet, 2003. "Enforcing Contracts: Should Courts Seek the Truth?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(1), pages 49-, March.
      • Claude Fluet, 2002. "Enforcing Contracts: Should Courts Seek the Truth?," Cahiers de recherche 0202, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]

6. Bruce H. Kobayashi, 1992. "Deterrence with Multiple Defendants: An Explanation for "Unfair" Plea Bargains," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(4), pages 507-517, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Sandeep Dahiya & David Yermack, 1999. "Wealth Creation and Destruction from Brooke Group's Tobacco Litigation Strategy," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-050, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-. [Downloadable!]

This page was last updated on 2009-10-23.