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Citations of
Jinwoo Kim

For current contact information and a more complete listing of works, please see here

The citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.

| Working papers | Articles | Access and download statistics

Working papers

  1. Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2007. "Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions," MPRA Paper 6098, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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    Cited by:

    1. Gorkem Celik, 2008. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 8(1). [Downloadable!]
    2. Antonio Estache & Atsuhi Iimi, 2008. "Procurement Efficiency for Infrastructure Development and Financial Needs Reassessed," ECARES Working Papers 2008_022, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Ecares. [Downloadable!]
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    3. Nicolas Gruyer, 2008. "Optimal Auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders (new version of "using lotteries ...")," Economics Working Papers 06, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school). [Downloadable!]
    4. Estache, Antonio & Iimi, Atsushi, 2009. "Auctions with endogenous participation and quality thresholds : evidence from ODA infrastructure procurement," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4853, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  2. James Andreoni & Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2005. "Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000474, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    1. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Reiss, J. Philipp & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2008. "A pure variation of risk in private-value auctions," Research Memoranda 050, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    2. Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 6476, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    3. David J. Cooper & Hanming Fang, 2006. "Understanding Overbidding in Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1557, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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    4. A. Alexander Elbittar, 2005. "Impact of Valuation Ranking Information on Bidding in First-Price," Microeconomics 0508008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    5. Hanming Fang, 2004. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Theory workshop papers 121473000000000021, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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Articles

  1. Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2006. "Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(4), pages 1063-1107, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    1. Gorkem Celik & Serdar Sayan, 2008. "On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 209-227, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    2. Tilman Börgers & Peter Norman, 2009. "A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: the case of independent types," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 477-489, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    3. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2008. "Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism," Micro Theory Working Papers gorkem_celik-2008-10, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 06 Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]
    4. Thomas Tröger & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2008. "Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse21_2008, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    5. Dequiedt, V., 2006. "Ratification and veto constraints in mechanism design," Working Papers 200606, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL). [Downloadable!]
    6. Zhijun, 2008. "Collusion and Strategic Favoritism in Organizations," Working Papers 08-27, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia. [Downloadable!]
    7. Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2006. "Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions," Discussion Papers 0506-22, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    8. Nicolas Gruyer, 2008. "Optimal Auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders (new version of "using lotteries ...")," Economics Working Papers 06, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school). [Downloadable!]
    9. Ichiro Obara, 2008. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 8(1). [Downloadable!]
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    10. Dequiedt, V., 2006. "Efficient collusion in optimal auctions," Working Papers 200607, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL). [Downloadable!]
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  2. Kim, Jinwoo & Che, Yeon-Koo, 2004. "Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 383-397, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Ricardo Gonçalves & John D Hey, 2007. "Experimental Evidence on English Auctions: Oral Outcry vs. Clock," Discussion Papers 07/09, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
    2. A. Alexander Elbittar, 2005. "Impact of Valuation Ranking Information on Bidding in First-Price," Microeconomics 0508008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    3. James Andreoni & Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2006. "Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment," Discussion Papers 0506-27, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    4. Hanming Fang & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1423, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-20.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.