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Citations of
Bernardo Guimaraes

For current contact information and a more complete listing of works, please see here

The citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.

| Working papers | Articles | Access and download statistics

Working papers

  1. Guimarães, Bernardo, 2007. "Optimal external debt and default," CEPR Discussion Papers 6035, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    Cited by:

    1. Nathan Foley-Fisher & Bernardo Guimaraes, 2009. "US Real Interest Rates and Default Risk in Emerging Economies," CEP Discussion Papers dp0952, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
    2. Emine Boz, 2009. "Sovereign Default, Private Sector Creditors and the IFIs," IMF Working Papers 09/46, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]

  2. Stephen Morris & Bernardo Guimaraes, 2004. "Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm424, Yale School of Management. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:

    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Crises," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1433R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000790, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Jozsef Sakovics & Jakub Steiner, 2008. "Who Matters in Coordination Problems?," ESE Discussion Papers 190, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    4. Tijmen Daniëls & Henk Jager & Franc Klaassen, 2009. "Defending Against Speculative Attacks," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2009-011, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    5. Geir H. Bjønnes & Steinar Holden & Dagfinn Rime & Haakon O. Aa. Solheim, 2009. "'Large' vs. 'Small' Players: A Closer Look at the Dynamics of Speculative Attacks," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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    6. Todd Keister, 2006. "Expectations and contagion in self-fulfilling currency attacks," Staff Reports 249, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
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    7. Christian Hellwig, . "Policy in a Global Coordination Game: Multiplicity vs. Robust Predictions (November 2006, with Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 401, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

  3. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Guimarães, Bernardo & Roubini, Nouriel, 2004. "International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of the IMF's Catalytic Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 4383, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Mark Carlson & Galina B. Hale, 2006. "Rating Agencies and Sovereign Debt Rollover," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(2). [Downloadable!]
    2. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change," NBER Working Papers 11017, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    3. Carlos de Resende, 2007. "IMF-Supported Adjustment Programs: Welfare Implications and the Catalytic Effect," Working Papers 07-22, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
    4. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2005. "Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps," Discussion Papers 1400, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    5. George-Marios Angeletos & Ivan Werning, 2004. "Crises and Prices: Information Aggregation, Multiplicity and Volatility," NBER Working Papers 11015, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    6. Francesca Viani, 2005. "International Monetary Fund Resources and Contagion Mechanisms: A Hypothesis," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 95(6), pages 69-103, November-. [Downloadable!]
    7. Jun Il Kim, 2006. "IMF-Supported Programs and Crisis Prevention: An Analytical Framework," IMF Working Papers 06/156, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]

  4. Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Crises," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1433R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:

    Cited by:

    1. Lars Calmfors & Giancarlo Corsetti & Seppo Honkapohja & John Kay & Willi Leibfritz & Gilles Saint-Paul & Hans-Werner Sinn & Xavier Vives, 2004. "EEAG European Economic Advisory Group at CESifo: Report on the European Economy 2004," EEAG Report on the European Economy, CESifo Group Munich, vol. 0, pages 1-148, October. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Lars Calmfors & Giancarlo Corsetti & Seppo Honkapohja & John Kay & Willi Leibfritz & Gilles Saint-Paul & Hans-Werner Sinn & Xavier Vives, 2004. "Acceding Countries: The Road to the Euro," EEAG Report on the European Economy, CESifo Group Munich, vol. 0, pages 119-136, October. [Downloadable!]

  5. Giancarlo Corsetti & Bernardo Guimaraes & Nouriel Roubini, 2003. "International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF's Catalytic Finance," NBER Working Papers 10125, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Manuela Goretti, 2005. "The Brazilian Currency Turmoil of 2002: A Nonlinear Analysis," International Finance 0506001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Eduardo Fernandez-Arias & Andrew Powell & Alessandro Rebucci, 2009. "The Multilateral Response to the Global Crisis: Rationale, Modalities, and Feasibility," RES Working Papers 4629, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    3. Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Country Insurance," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 290, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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    4. Ilan Noy, 2004. "Do IMF Bailouts Result in Moral Hazard? An Events-Study Approach," Working Papers 200402, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    5. José Wynne & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2004. "Renegotiation, Collective Action Clauses and Sovereign Debt Markets," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 153, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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    6. Olivier Jeanne & Jonathan David Ostry & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 08/236, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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    7. J. Brandes & Tobias Schüle, 2008. "IMF’s assistance: Devil’s kiss or guardian angel?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 63-86, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    8. Juan Zalduendo & Uma Ramakrishnan, 2006. "The Role of IMF Support in Crisis Prevention," IMF Working Papers 06/75, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    9. Carlos de Resende, 2007. "IMF-Supported Adjustment Programs: Welfare Implications and the Catalytic Effect," Working Papers 07-22, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
    10. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2005. "Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps," Discussion Papers 1400, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    11. Christian Hellwig, . "Policy in a Global Coordination Game: Multiplicity vs. Robust Predictions (November 2006, with Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 401, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    12. Ashoka Mody & Nienke Oomes & Michael D. Bordo, 2004. "Keeping Capital Flowing: The Role of the IMF," IMF Working Papers 04/197, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    13. Corrado, L. & Miller, M. & Zhang, L., 2007. "Bulls, Bears and Excess Volatility: can currency intervention help?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0708, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
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    14. Itai Agur, 2009. "What Institutional Structure for the Lender of Last Resort?," DNB Working Papers 200, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    15. Emine Boz, 2009. "Sovereign Default, Private Sector Creditors and the IFIs," IMF Working Papers 09/46, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    16. Tobias Knedlik, 2006. "Implementing an International Lender of Last Resort," IWH Discussion Papers 20-06, Halle Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    17. Aitor Erce-Domínguez, 2006. "Using standstills to manage sovereign debt crises," Banco de España Working Papers 0636, Banco de España. [Downloadable!]


Articles

  1. Guimaraes, Bernardo & Morris, Stephen, 2007. "Risk and wealth in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2205-2230, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  2. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Guimaraes, Bernardo & Roubini, Nouriel, 2006. "International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 441-471, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  3. Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2006. "Dynamics of currency crises with asset market frictions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 141-158, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Tijmen Daniëls & Henk Jager & Franc Klaassen, 2009. "Defending Against Speculative Attacks," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2009-011, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Yin-Wong Cheung & Daniel Friedman, 2008. "Speculative Attacks: A Laboratory Study in Continuous Time," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001115, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Bernardo Guimaraes, 2008. "Vulnerability of Currency Pegs: Evidence from Brazil," CEP Discussion Papers dp0871, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
    5. Gara Minguez-Afonso, 2007. "Imperfect Common Knowledge in First-Generation Models of Currency Crises," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), pages 81-112, March. [Downloadable!]
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    6. Guimarães, Bernardo, 2007. "Currency Crisis Triggers: Sunspots or Thresholds?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6487, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    7. Leila Ali & Yan Kestens, 2006. "Contagion and Crises Clusters: Toward a Regional Warning System?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 142(4), pages 814-839, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    8. Broner, Fernando A, 2006. "Discrete Devaluations and Multiple Equilibria in a First Generation Model of Currency Crises," CEPR Discussion Papers 5876, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    9. Zhiguo He & Wei Xiong, 2009. "Dynamic Debt Runs," NBER Working Papers 15482, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)


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This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.


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