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Citations of
Bernardo Guimaraes

For current contact information and a more complete listing of works, please see here

The citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.

| Working papers | Articles | Access and download statistics

Working papers

  1. Stephen Morris & Bernardo Guimaraes, 2004. "Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm424, Yale School of Management. [Downloadable!]
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    Cited by:

    1. Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Crises," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1433R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000790, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    3. Todd Keister, 2006. "Expectations and contagion in self-fulfilling currency attacks," Staff Reports 249, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
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    4. Christian Hellwig, . "Policy in a Global Coordination Game: Multiplicity vs. Robust Predictions (November 2006, with Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 401, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

  2. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Guimarães, Bernardo & Roubini, Nouriel, 2004. "International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of the IMF's Catalytic Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 4383, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change," NBER Working Papers 11017, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    2. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2005. "Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps," Discussion Papers 1400, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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    3. George-Marios Angeletos & Ivan Werning, 2004. "Crises and Prices: Information Aggregation, Multiplicity and Volatility," NBER Working Papers 11015, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    4. Mark Carlson & Galina Hale, 2006. "Rating Agencies and Sovereign Debt Rollover," Topics in Macroeconomics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 6(2), pages 1375-1375. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    5. Jun Il Kim, 2006. "IMF-Supported Programs and Crisis Prevention: An Analytical Framework," IMF Working Papers 06/156, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]

  3. Giancarlo Corsetti & Bernardo Guimaraes & Nouriel Roubini, 2003. "International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF's Catalytic Finance," NBER Working Papers 10125, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Cited by:

    1. Manuela Goretti, 2005. "The Brazilian Currency Turmoil of 2002: A Nonlinear Analysis," International Finance 0506001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Ilan Noy, 2004. "Do IMF Bailouts Result in Moral Hazard? An Events-Study Approach," Working Papers 200402, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    3. José Wynne & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2004. "Renegotiation, Collective Action Clauses and Sovereign Debt Markets," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 153, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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    4. Olivier Jeanne & Jonathan David Ostry & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 08/236, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    5. Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "Country Insurance," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 52(si), pages 6. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    6. Juan Zalduendo & Uma Ramakrishnan, 2006. "The Role of IMF Support in Crisis Prevention," IMF Working Papers 06/75, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    7. Carlos de Resende, 2007. "IMF-Supported Adjustment Programs: Welfare Implications and the Catalytic Effect," Working Papers 07-22, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
    8. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2005. "Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps," Discussion Papers 1400, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    9. Christian Hellwig, . "Policy in a Global Coordination Game: Multiplicity vs. Robust Predictions (November 2006, with Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 401, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    10. Ashoka Mody & Nienke Oomes & Michael D. Bordo, 2004. "Keeping Capital Flowing: The Role of the IMF," IMF Working Papers 04/197, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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    11. Corrado, L. & Miller, M. & Zhang, L., 2007. "Bulls, Bears and Excess Volatility: can currency intervention help?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0708, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
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    12. Tobias Knedlik, 2006. "Implementing an International Lender of Last Resort," IWH Discussion Papers 20-06, Halle Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    13. Aitor Erce-Domínguez, 2006. "Using standstills to manage sovereign debt crises," Banco de España Working Papers 0636, Banco de España. [Downloadable!]
    14. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2005. "The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard)," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 52(si), pages 5. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Articles

  1. Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2006. "Dynamics of currency crises with asset market frictions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 141-158, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Yin-Wong Cheung & Daniel Friedman, 2008. "Speculative Attacks: A Laboratory Study in Continuous Time," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    2. Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001115, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    3. Bernardo Guimaraes, 2008. "Vulnerability of Currency Pegs: Evidence from Brazil," CEP Discussion Papers dp0871, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
    4. Gara Minguez-Afonso, 2007. "Imperfect Common Knowledge in First-Generation Models of Currency Crises," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), pages 81-112, March. [Downloadable!]
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    5. Guimarães, Bernardo, 2007. "Currency Crisis Triggers: Sunspots or Thresholds?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6487, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    6. Leila Ali & Yan Kestens, 2006. "Contagion and Crises Clusters: Toward a Regional Warning System?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 142(4), pages 814-839, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    7. Broner, Fernando A, 2006. "Discrete Devaluations and Multiple Equilibria in a First Generation Model of Currency Crises," CEPR Discussion Papers 5876, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Guimaraes, Bernardo & Roubini, Nouriel, 2006. "International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 441-471, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    See citations under working paper version above.

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This page was last updated on 2008-12-1.

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