Citations of
Björn Frank

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Working papers

1. Björn Frank, 2003. "Location Decisions in a Changing Labour Market Environment," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 380, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]

   Cited by:

   1. Kristjan-Olari Leping, 2005. "Measuring the Specificity of Human Capital: a Skill-based Approach," Working Papers 134, School of Economics and Business Administration, Tallinn University of Technology. [Downloadable!]

1. Ralf Dewenter & Björn Frank & Christian Wey, 2005. "Monopolalarm im Pressesektor: geplante GWB-Novelle schadet der Pressevielfalt," Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 72(8), pages 147-152. [Downloadable!]

   Cited by:

   1. Ralf Dewenter & Björn Frank, 2005. "Wettbewerbsprobleme in Pressemärkten: Editorial," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 74(3), pages 5-9. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

2. Günther G. Schulze & Björn Frank, 2003. "Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 143-160, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Bjorn Frank & Guenther G. Schulze, 2000. "Deterrence versus Intrinsic Motivation: Experimental Evidence on the Determinants of Corruptibility," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0950, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]

   Cited by:

   1. Ernst Fehr, 2003. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," Microeconomics 0305010, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3185, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      • Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 507, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
      • Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological foundations of incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 687-724, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      • Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, . "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," IEW - Working Papers iewwp095, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
      • Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   2. Marie-Claire Villeval & David Dickinson, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Working Papers 0409, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Post-Print halshs-00175010_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
      • Dickinson, David & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2008. "Does monitoring decrease work effort?: The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 56-76, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      • Dickinson, David & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," IZA Discussion Papers 1222, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
      • David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2005. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Working Papers 05-12, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University. [Downloadable!]
      • David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theorie," Post-Print halshs-00180112_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
   3. Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005. "Corruption as Betrayal : Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation," Working Papers 0506, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005. "Corruption as Betrayal : Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation," Post-Print halshs-00180044_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
   4. Fernanda Rivas, 2006. "An experiment on corruption and gender," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0806, Department of Economics - dECON. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Maria Fernanda Rivas, 2008. "An experiment on corruption and gender," ThE Papers 08/10, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.. [Downloadable!]
   5. Bruno S. Frey, 2006. "Evaluitis – Eine Neue Krankheit," IEW - Working Papers iewwp293, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Bruno S. Frey, 2006. "Evaluitis – Eine neue Krankheit," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-18, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
   6. Matteo Rizzolli & Luca Stanca, 2009. "Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 170, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2009. [Downloadable!]
   7. Petra Stykow, 2004. "Der Fall Russland: Korruption als Kollateralschaden der Transformation?," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(2), pages 247-262.
   8. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, . "Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition," IEW - Working Papers iewwp084, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
   9. Andrea Butelmann & Francisco Gallego, 2001. "Estimaciones de los Determinantes del Ahorro Voluntario de los Hogares en Chile (1988 Y 1997)," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 97, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
   10. Olivier Armantier & Amadou Boly, 2008. "Can Corruption Be Studied in the Lab? Comparing a Field and a Lab Experiment," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-26, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
   11. Elke Renner, 2004. "Wie lässt sich Korruption wirksam bekämpfen?: Empirische Befunde aus der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(2), pages 292-300.
   12. Uri Gneezy, 2003. "The W effect of incentives," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000315, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   13. Hörisch, Hannah & Strassmair, Christina, 2008. "An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis," Discussion Papers in Economics 2139, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

This page was last updated on 2009-11-8.