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Publications

by members of

Economics Education and Research Consortium (EERC)
Moscow, Russia

These are publications listed in RePEc written by members of the above institution who are registered with the RePEc Author Service. Thus this compiles the works all those currently affiliated with this institutions, not those affilated at the time of publication. List of registered members. Register yourself. This page is updated in the first days of each month.
| Working papers | Journal articles |

Working papers

Undated material is listed at the end

    1999

  1. Soubeyran, A. & Weber, A., 1999. "Localization of Activities: an Endogenous Geographical Choice," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 99a02, Universite Aix-Marseille III.

    1996

  1. Rossell, M & Soubeyran, A. & Weber, S., 1996. "Stability of a Research Joint Venture," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 96a33, Universite Aix-Marseille III.

    1995

  1. Le Breton, M. & Weber, S., 1995. "Stability of Coalition Structures and the Principle of Optimal Partitioning," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 95a06, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  2. Le Breton, M. & Weber, S., 1995. "Strong Equilibrium in a Model with Partial Rivalry," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 95a07, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  3. Le Breton, M. & Konishi, H. & Weber, S., 1995. "Equivalence of Strong and Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in Games without Spillovers," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 95a39, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  4. Le Breton, M. & Konishi, H. & Weber, S., 1995. "Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Game with Positive Externalities," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 95a40, Universite Aix-Marseille III.

    1992

  1. Weber, S., 1992. "An Equilibrium in Electoral Competition with Entry Costs," Papers 92-5, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  2. Breton, M. le & Weber, S., 1992. "Stability of Coalition Structures and the Principle of Optimal Partitioning," Papers 93-6, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.

    1991

  1. Breton,Michael Le & Weber,Shlomo, 1991. "A note on the Core and Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions of simple games," Discussion Paper Serie A 332, University of Bonn, Germany.
  2. Le Breton,Michel & Owen,Guillermo & Weber,Shlomo, 1991. "Strongly balanced cooperative games," Discussion Paper Serie A 338, University of Bonn, Germany.
  3. Valery Vasil'ev & Shlomo Weber & Hans Wiesmeth, 1991. "The Equivalence of Core and Lindahl Equilibria in an Economy with Semi-Public Goods," Discussion Paper Serie B 200, University of Bonn, Germany.
  4. Le Breton, M. & Owen, G. & Weber, S., 1991. "Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 91a09, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  5. Greenberg, J. & Weber, S., 1991. "Stable Coalition Structures with Unidimensional Set of Alternatives," Papers 9133, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  6. Greenberg, J. & Weber, S., 1991. "Stable Coalition Structure with Unidimensional Set of Alternatives," Papers 91-11, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  7. Le Breton, M. & Weber, S., 1991. "A Note on the Core and von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions of Simple Games," Papers 91-12, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  8. Vasilev, V. & Weber, S. & Wiesmeth, H., 1991. "The Equivalence of Core and Lindahl Equilibria in an Economy with Semi- Public Goods," Papers 91-13, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  9. Le Breton, M. & Owen, G. & Weber, S., 1991. "Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games," Papers 92-3, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  10. Donnenfeld, S. & Weber, S., 1991. "Limit Qualities and Entry Deterrence," Papers 92-4, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.

    1990

  1. Shlomo Weber & Hans Wiesmeth, 1990. "An Equivalence Result for the Core of an Economy with a Public Good," Discussion Paper Serie A 282, University of Bonn, Germany.
  2. Weber,Shlomo, 1990. "On hierachical spatial competition," Discussion Paper Serie A 331, University of Bonn, Germany.
  3. Le Breton, M. & Weber, S., 1990. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions To The Nakamura Number," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 90a22, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  4. Weber, S. & Wiesmeth, H., 1990. "On the Theory of Cost Sharing," Papers 90-10, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  5. Weber, S. & Kilgour, M. & Brams, S.J., 1990. "Sequential Arbitration Procedures," Papers 90-5, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  6. Weber, S. & Wiesmeth, H., 1990. "An Equivalence Result for the Core of an Economy with a Public Good," Papers 90-6, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  7. Weber, S. & Wiesmeth, H., 1990. "Economic Models of NATO," Papers 90-7, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  8. Weber, S. & Appelbaum, E., 1990. "Precommitments and Probabilistic Entry Deterrence in Oligopoly," Papers 90-8, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  9. Weber, S., 1990. "On Existence of a Fixed-Number Equilibrium in a Multiparty Electoral System," Papers 90-9, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.

    1989

  1. Shlomo Weber & Hans Wiesmeth, 1989. "The Theory of Cost Sharing," Discussion Paper Serie A 257, University of Bonn, Germany.
  2. Weber, S. & Wiesmeth, H., 1989. "An Economic Analysis Of Cooperation In The European Community," Papers 89-03, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  3. Weber, S., 1989. "On Hierarchical Spatial Competition," Papers 89-04, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  4. Appelbaum, E. & Weber, S., 1989. "Equilibrium Entry Patterns Under Uncertainty," Papers 89-11, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  5. Donnenfeld, S. & Weber, S., 1989. "The Principle Of Maximal Product Differentiation," Papers 89-12, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  6. Greenberg, J. & Weber, S., 1989. "Coalition Formation With Eligibility," Papers 8901, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  7. Weber, S. & Wiesmeth, H., 1989. "Burden Sharing in NATO: an Economic Analysis," Papers 90-4, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.

    1983

  1. Martin Shubik & Shlomo Weber, 1983. "A Note on the 'Corelessness' of Antibalance of a Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 678R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised 1984. [Downloadable!]

    Undated

  1. Ginsburgh,Victor & MacLeod,Bentley & Weber,Shlomo, . "Price discrimination and product line rivalry," Discussion Paper Serie B 92, University of Bonn, Germany.

Journal articles

    1997

  1. Shlomo Weber, 1997. "Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 31-56. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    1996

  1. Michel Le Breton & Hideo Konishi & Shlomo Weber, 1996. "Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 97-113.
  2. Deb, Rajat & Weber, Shlomo & Winter, Eyal, 1996. "The Nakamura Theorem for Coalition Structures of Quota Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 189-98.

    1995

  1. Shabtai Donnenfeld & Shlomo Weber, 1995. "Limit Qualities and Entry Deterrence," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 113-130, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Hans Wiesmeth & Valery Vasil'ev & Shlomo Weber, 1995. "Core equivalence with congested public goods," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 373-387.
  3. Vasil'ev, Valery & Weber, Shlomo & Wiesmeth, Hans, 1995. "Core Equivalence with Congested Public Goods," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 373-87, November.

    1992

  1. Le Breton, M & Owen, G & Weber, S, 1992. "Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 419-27.

    1986

  1. Kirman, Alan P & Oddou, Claude & Weber, Shlomo, 1986. "Stochastic Communication and Coalition Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 129-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    1985

  1. Greenberg, Joseph & Weber, Shlomo, 1985. "Consistent d-Relative Majority Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 463-64, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.