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A Reader in International Corporate Finance, Volume Two

Author

Listed:
  • Stijn Claessens
  • Luc Laeven

Abstract

The Reader in International Corporate Finance offers an overview of current thinking on six topics: law and finance, corporate governance, banking, capital markets, capital structure and financing constraints, and the political economy of finance. This collection of 23 of the most influential articles published in the period 2000-2006 reflects two new trends: 1) interest in international aspects of corporate finance, particularly specific to emerging markets, and 2) awareness of the importance of institutions in explaining global differences in corporate finance.

Suggested Citation

  • Stijn Claessens & Luc Laeven, 2006. "A Reader in International Corporate Finance, Volume Two," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 7115, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbpubs:7115
    as

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    File URL: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/7115/370950v20Reade101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf?sequence=1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ethan Kaplan & Dani Rodrik, 2002. "Did the Malaysian Capital Controls Work?," NBER Chapters, in: Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, pages 393-440, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Guillermo Zamarripa, 2003. "Related Lending," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(1), pages 231-268.
    3. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 265, OECD Publishing.
    4. Campbell, John Y, 1996. "Understanding Risk and Return," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(2), pages 298-345, April.
    5. Rudi Dornbusch, 2001. "Malaysia: Was it Different?," NBER Working Papers 8325, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Which Capitalism? Lessons Form The East Asian Crisis," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 11(3), pages 40-48, September.
    7. Randall Morck & David Stangeland & Bernard Yeung, 2000. "Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth The Canadian Disease?," NBER Chapters, in: Concentrated Corporate Ownership, pages 319-372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    9. Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1995. "The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(2), pages 407-443.
    10. Reese, William Jr. & Weisbach, Michael S., 2002. "Protection of minority shareholder interests, cross-listings in the United States, and subsequent equity offerings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 65-104, October.
    11. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
    12. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November.
    13. Olivier Blanchard, 2000. "What Do We Know about Macroeconomics that Fisher and Wicksell Did Not?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1375-1409.
    14. Parente, Stephen L & Prescott, Edward C, 1994. "Barriers to Technology Adoption and Development," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 298-321, April.
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