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The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms : Implications for Aid Effectiveness

Author

Listed:
  • Kent Eaton
  • Kai Kaiser
  • Paul J. Smoke

Abstract

This volume presents a preliminary framework designed to help international development partners consider the relevance of political economy issues for their programmatic support to decentralization and local government reform. The intention is neither to advocate decentralization in general or in any particular form, nor to presume or privilege any particular decentralization objective. Instead, the purpose is to document the potential value of better understanding how (primarily national and intergovernmental) political and institutional dynamics do or could affect the scope for realizing decentralization reforms aligned with commonly advocated service delivery, governance, and poverty reduction goals. The underlying premise is that systematic analysis of these issues can productively complement the dominantly technical diagnostic work typically carried out by development partners. Specifically, development partners can benefit from better understanding the practical significance of motives that drive politicians and bureaucrats to support or oppose reform at various stages of the decentralization process, from making an initial reform decision to detailed design and implementation. In addition, the framework addresses how these incentives can weaken, strengthen, or shift in response to changes in political and economic conditions that arise after reform begins. A general approach to conducting political economy of decentralization analysis is outlined, recognizing the need to tailor such analysis to the particular country context. This volume is based on literature reviews and knowledge derived from selected country experiences.

Suggested Citation

  • Kent Eaton & Kai Kaiser & Paul J. Smoke, 2011. "The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms : Implications for Aid Effectiveness," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 2336, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbpubs:2336
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Khan, Qaiser & Faguet, Jean-Paul & Ambel, Alemayehu, 2017. "Blending Top-Down Federalism with Bottom-Up Engagement to Reduce Inequality in Ethiopia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 326-342.
    2. Herrera, Veronica, 2014. "Does Commercialization Undermine the Benefits of Decentralization for Local Services Provision? Evidence from Mexico’s Urban Water and Sanitation Sector," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 16-31.
    3. Kelly Krawczyk & Raymond Muhula, 2018. "Engaging decentralization in an uncertain political context: Lessons from Liberia," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 36(3), pages 369-386, May.
    4. William Ascher, 2021. "Coping with intelligence deficits in poverty-alleviation policies in low-income countries," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 54(2), pages 345-370, June.
    5. Paul Smoke, 2013. "Why Theory and Practice are Different: The Gap Between Principles and Reality in Subnational Revenue Systems," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1313, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    6. Paul Smoke, 2014. "Why theory and practice are different: The gap between principles and reality in subnational revenue systems," Chapters, in: Richard M. Bird & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (ed.), Taxation and Development: The Weakest Link?, chapter 9, pages 287-325, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Gyldas Ofoulhast†Othamot, 2018. "The conundrum between political and sectoral decentralizations: The case of Cameroon," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 36(3), pages 347-367, May.
    8. Berenschot, Ward & Mulder, Peter, 2019. "Explaining regional variation in local governance: Clientelism and state-dependency in Indonesia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 233-244.
    9. Leonardo Romeo & Paul Smoke, 2014. "The Political Economy of Local Infrastructure Planning," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1417, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    10. Smoke, Paul, 2016. "Looking Beyond Conventional Intergovernmental Fiscal Frameworks: Principles, Realities, and Neglected Issues," ADBI Working Papers 606, Asian Development Bank Institute.
    11. Faguet, Jean-Paul, 2014. "Decentralization and Governance," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 2-13.
    12. Bangkit A. Wiryawan & Christian Otchia, 2022. "The legacy of the reformasi: the role of local government spending on industrial development in a decentralized Indonesia," Journal of Economic Structures, Springer;Pan-Pacific Association of Input-Output Studies (PAPAIOS), vol. 11(1), pages 1-19, December.
    13. Herrera, Veronica & Post, Alison E., 2014. "Can Developing Countries Both Decentralize and Depoliticize Urban Water Services? Evaluating the Legacy of the 1990s Reform Wave," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 621-641.
    14. Anton Malkin & Bessma Momani, 2016. "An Effective Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: A Bottom Up Approach," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 7(4), pages 521-530, November.
    15. Dincer, Hasan & Hacioglu, Umit & Tatoglu, Ekrem & Delen, Dursun, 2019. "Developing a hybrid analytics approach to measure the efficiency of deposit banks," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 131-145.
    16. Paul Smoke & Mehmet Serkan Tosun & Serdar Yilmaz, 2023. "Subnational government responses to the Covid‐19 pandemic: Expectations, realities and lessons for the future," Public Administration & Development, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(2), pages 97-105, May.
    17. Erol BULUT & Bashir Ismail ABDOW, 2018. "Decentralization and Poverty Reduction: Opportunities and Challenges in Kenya," Sosyoekonomi Journal, Sosyoekonomi Society, issue 26(36).

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