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Social Security and Early Retirement

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Author Info
Robert Fenge () (Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Pierre Pestieau () (University of Liège)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The contrasting trends toward earlier retirement and greater longevity have resulted in steadily increasing retirement costs over the last forty years. One important factor influencing early retirement decisions is the expansion of retirement benefits; but studies predict that most countries, particularly those with early retirement incentives, will be unable to meet future pension and social security obligations. In this timely CESifo volume, Robert Fenge and Pierre Pestieau examine empirical and theoretical evidence that explains why early retirement has become such a burden for social security systems and suggest pension system reforms that will reverse the trend. Drawing on evidence from the European Union (with comparisons to other industrialized countries including the United States and Canada), the authors demonstrate that the effective retirement age is influenced by social security regulations (such as a change in eligibility age) and discuss ways of measuring these embedded incentives. Fenge and Pestieau examine the implicit taxes on prolonged working life from normative and political economy perspectives. They discuss optimal payroll tax rates that minimize distortions of labor supply and retirement decisions and consider alternative ways to finance benefits, including consumption and capital income taxation. They discuss why policies are designed to discourage employment among older workers and why reforms to counter this often meet resistance. They demonstrate, contrary to the belief of many European governments, that pushing older workers into retirement does not free jobs for young unemployed workers. They show that the gap between salaries and productivity is an incentive for employers to rid themselves of older workers and argue that governments should not support this behavior by compensating older workers for the difference between severance payments and salaries in early retirement programs.

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Publisher Info
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
This book is provided by The MIT Press in its series MIT Press Books with number 0262062496 and published in 2005.

Volume: 1
Edition: 1
ISBN: 0-262-06249-6
Handle: RePEc:mtp:titles:0262062496

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Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Jake Furbush).

Related research
Keywords: social security; early retirement; pension system reform;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Walter H. Fisher & Christian Keuschnigg, 2007. "Pension Reform and Labor Market Incentives," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2007 2007-13, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Thomas Gries & Stefan Jungblut & Tim Krieger & Henning Meier, 2009. "Statutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning," Working Papers 9, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Canegrati, Emanuele, 2006. "The Single-Mindedness Theory: Micro-foundation and Applications to Social Security Systems," MPRA Paper 1223, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2007. [Downloadable!]
  4. repec:ese:iserwp: is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Marjan, MAES, 2008. "Poverty persistence among Belgian elderly in the transition from work to retirement : an empirical analysis," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2008042, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
  6. Jaag, Christian / Keuschnigg, Christian / Keuschnigg, Mirela, 2007. "Pension Reform, Retirement and Life-Cycle Unemployment," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Christian Keuschnigg & Mirela Keuschnigg & Christian Jaag, 2009. "Aging and the Financing of Social Security in Switzerland," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2009 2009-26, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.


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