AbstractKlaus Beckmann presents an economic theory of tax evasion, dealing with both the individual's decision to cheat on his or her taxes and the social consequences of, as well as policies against, tax evasion. In the first part of this book, he reviews the neo-classical theory of tax evasion, extending it by introducing communitarian preferences and elements of bounded rationality. The second part comprises a systematic treatment of the social costs and benefits of evasion, including macroeconomic as well as public choice aspects. (Published in German.)
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Bibliographic InfoThis book is provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its series Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft with number urn:isbn:9783161481819 and published in 2003.
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- Wolfram F. Richter, 2007. "Geplante Steuerhinterziehung und ihre effiziente Bestrafung," RWI Materialien, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, pages 31, 08.
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