The role of public-private partnerships in local infrastructure : the case of carbon offset projects
AbstractInvestment in low carbon infrastructure is considered an important component of the fight against climate change. The mechanisms of climate regulation (such as carbon offsets) transfer to project developers the risks associated with reducing emissions of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, i.e. operational and technological risk, or risks associated with the environmental monitoring and the regulatory mechanism itself. The success of projects depends importantly on the risk sharing arrangements between the private and public partners. It is shown that the delegation of tasks between the partners can create risks that affect the environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency of the project. For a sample of landfill gas flaring projects financed under the Clean Development Mechanism, it is shown that the outsourcing of the provision of technology creates additional risks. The outsourcing of the development of the official project documentation required by the UNFCCC and the separation of the operation of the landfill and the CDM project development appear to be manageable by risk sharing arrangements.
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Bibliographic InfoThis book is provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/8201 and published in 2011.
partenariats privé-public; infrastructure locale; gestion des déchets; Mécanisme pour un Développement Propre; changement climatique; théorie des contrats; Public-private partnerships; local infrastructure; waste management; Clean Development Mechanism; climate change; contract theory;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
- Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Oliver Hart, 2003.
"Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(486), pages C69-C76, March.
- Oliver Hart, 2002. "Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 02/061, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
- Dewatripont, Mathias & Legros, Patrick, 2005. "Public-private partnerships: contract design and risk transfer," EIB Papers 5/2005, European Investment Bank, Economics Department.
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