The Economic Theory of Eminent Domain
AbstractSurveys the contributions that economic theory has made to the often contentious debate over the government's use of its power of eminent domain, as prescribed by the Fifth Amendment. It addresses such questions as: when should the government be allowed to take private property without the owner's consent? Does it depend on how the land will be used? Also, what amount of compensation is the landowner entitled to receive (if any)? The recent case of Kelo v. New London (2005) revitalized the debate, but it was only the latest skirmish in the ongoing struggle between advocates of strong governmental powers to acquire private property in the public interest and private property rights advocates. Written for a general audience, the book advances a coherent theory that views eminent domain within the context of the government's proper role in an economic system whose primary objective is to achieve efficient land use.
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Bibliographic InfoThis book is provided by Cambridge University Press in its series Cambridge Books with number 9781107005259 and published in 2011.
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- Thomas J. Miceli & Katherine A. Pancak, 2013. "Using Eminent Domain to Write-Down Mortgages: An Economic Analysis," Working papers 2013-05, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2011. "Regulatory Takings," Working papers 2011-16, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Christian At & Sylvain Béal & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2013. "Freezeout, Compensation Rules and Voting Equilibria," Working Papers 2013-04, CRESE.
- Thomas J. Miceli, 2013. "The Color of Law: An Economic Theory of Legal Boundaries," Working papers 2013-17, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
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