Capital and Credit
AbstractContemporary general equilibrium theory is characteristically short-run, separated from monetary aspects of the economy, and as such does not deal with long-run problems such as capital accumulation, innovation, and the historical movement of the economy. These phenomena are discussed by growth theory, which assumes a given or shifting production function, and in turn cannot therefore deal with the fundamental problem of growth, namely how the production function is derived. Thus traditional theories have a common weakness in that they divorce real economic growth from the activities of the financial sector. This book provides a much-needed synthesis of growth theory and monetary theory. Professor Morishima draws on the work of Schumpeter, Keynes and the pre-war neoclassical economists to formulate a capital-theoretic general equilibrium theory.
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Bibliographic InfoThis book is provided by Cambridge University Press in its series Cambridge Books with number 9780521466387 and published in 1994.
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