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The Economic Theory of Eminent Domain

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  • Miceli,Thomas J.

Abstract

Surveys the contributions that economic theory has made to the often contentious debate over the government's use of its power of eminent domain, as prescribed by the Fifth Amendment. It addresses such questions as: when should the government be allowed to take private property without the owner's consent? Does it depend on how the land will be used? Also, what amount of compensation is the landowner entitled to receive (if any)? The recent case of Kelo v. New London (2005) revitalized the debate, but it was only the latest skirmish in the ongoing struggle between advocates of strong governmental powers to acquire private property in the public interest and private property rights advocates. Written for a general audience, the book advances a coherent theory that views eminent domain within the context of the government's proper role in an economic system whose primary objective is to achieve efficient land use.

Suggested Citation

  • Miceli,Thomas J., 2011. "The Economic Theory of Eminent Domain," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521182973.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521182973
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    Cited by:

    1. Soumendu Sarkar, 2022. "Optimal mechanism for land acquisition," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(1), pages 87-116, March.
    2. Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Ram Singh, 2018. "Takings of Land by Self-Interested Governments: Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(3), pages 427-459.
    3. Thomas J. Miceli & Katherine A. Pancak, 2013. "Using Eminent Domain to Write-Down Mortgages: An Economic Analysis," Working papers 2013-05, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    4. Kim, Iljoong & Park, Sungkyu, 2018. "Private takings: Empirical evidence of post-taking performance," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 25-32.
    5. Laura Rae Dove, 2016. "Introducing the Moral Foundations of Capitalism in Undergraduate Business Law and Ethics Courses Using Kelo v. City of New London," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(Summer 20), pages 87-95.
    6. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2014. "Takings," Working papers 2014-17, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    7. Paul Pecorino, 2013. "Compensation for Regulatory Takings with a Redistributive Government," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 80(2), pages 488-501, October.
    8. Miceli, Thomas J. & Pancak, Katherine & Segerson, Kathleen, 2017. "Using eminent domain to refinance underwater mortgages: A welfare analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 12-22.
    9. Sarkar, Soumendu, 2018. "Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 37-46.
    10. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2011. "Regulatory Takings," Working papers 2011-16, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    11. Justin Dijk & Erik Ansink & Daan van Soest, 2017. "Buyouts and Agglomeration Bonuses in Wildlife Corridor Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-036/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    12. Steven P. Lanza & Thomas J. Miceli & C. F. Sirmans & Moussa Diop, 2013. "The Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development in the Era of Kelo," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 27(4), pages 352-362, November.
    13. Soumendu Sarkar, 2017. "Mechanism design for land acquisition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 783-812, August.

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