Lobbying: Buying and utilizing access
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DOI: 10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2014-2
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Brodmann, Jennifer & Unsal, Omer & Hassan, M. Kabir, 2019. "Political lobbying, insider trading, and CEO compensation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 548-565.
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More about this item
Keywords
Lobbying; free-rider problem; size-distribution-of-firms; world-price; labormarket-flexibility;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H0 - Public Economics - - General
- F16 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Labor Market Interactions
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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