IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/zbw/ifweej/20137.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Register, cap and trade: A proposal for containing systemic liquidy risk

Author

Listed:
  • Milne, Alistair

Abstract

A fundamental cause of the global financial crisis was excessive maturity mismatch, notably shadow banking holdings of sub-prime MBS and other structured credit instruments and cross-border Euro area interbank lending to the uncompetitive Euro area periphery. The costs of short term funding do not fully reflect underlying asset risks and this created systemic liquidity and credit risks. This externality can be controlled through the issue of tradable licenses for short term funding. This is a simpler and more efficient way of addressing systemic liquidity risk than the controls on individual institutions proposed by international regulators.

Suggested Citation

  • Milne, Alistair, 2013. "Register, cap and trade: A proposal for containing systemic liquidy risk," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 7, pages 1-31.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifweej:20137
    DOI: 10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2013-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2013-7
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/71407/1/739272217.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2013-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Enrico Perotti & Javier Suarez, 2011. "A Pigovian Approach to Liquidity Regulation," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 7(4), pages 3-41, December.
    2. James Tobin, 1978. "A Proposal for International Monetary Reform," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 4(3-4), pages 153-159, Jul/Oct.
    3. Jeanne, Olivier & Korinek, Anton, 2019. "Managing credit booms and busts: A Pigouvian taxation approach," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 2-17.
    4. Mr. Michael Kumhof & Mr. Jaromir Benes, 2012. "The Chicago Plan Revisited," IMF Working Papers 2012/202, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Ronnie J. Phillips, "undated". "Narrow Banking Reconsidered, The Functional Approach to Financial Reform," Economics Public Policy Brief Archive ppb_17, Levy Economics Institute.
    6. James Tobin, 1987. "The case for preserving regulatory distinctions," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 167-205.
    7. Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, 2012. "The Optimal Conduct of Monetary Policy with Interest on Reserves," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 266-282, January.
    8. Ronnie Phillips, 1992. "Credit Markets and Narrow Banking," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_77, Levy Economics Institute.
    9. Ms. Sheri M. Markose, 2012. "Systemic Risk from Global Financial Derivatives: A Network Analysis of Contagion and Its Mitigation with Super-Spreader Tax," IMF Working Papers 2012/282, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Doluca, Hasan & Klüh, Ulrich & Wagner, Marco & Weder di Mauro, Beatrice, 2010. "Reducing systemic relevance: A proposal," Working Papers 04/2010, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
    11. Jeremy C. Stein, 2011. "Monetary Policy as Financial-Stability Regulation," NBER Working Papers 16883, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Victor A. Beker, 2016. "The European Debt Crisis," Financial and Monetary Policy Studies, in: Modern Financial Crises, edition 127, chapter 0, pages 135-160, Springer.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Masciandaro, Donato & Passarelli, Francesco, 2013. "Financial systemic risk: Taxation or regulation?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 587-596.
    2. Mr. Anton Korinek, 2011. "The New Economics of Capital Controls Imposed for Prudential Reasons+L4888," IMF Working Papers 2011/298, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Pfister Christian, 2020. "The 100% Reserve Reform: Calamity or Opportunity?," Working papers 786, Banque de France.
    4. Eric Monnet & Miklos Vari, 2023. "A Dilemma between Liquidity Regulation and Monetary Policy: Some History and Theory," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(4), pages 915-944, June.
    5. Brunnermeier, Markus K. & Niepelt, Dirk, 2019. "On the equivalence of private and public money," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 27-41.
    6. Dirk Niepelt, 2020. "Reserves for All? Central Bank Digital Currency, Deposits, and Their (Non)-Equivalence," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16(3), pages 211-238, June.
    7. Ansgar Walther, 2016. "Jointly Optimal Regulation of Bank Capital and Liquidity," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(2-3), pages 415-448, March.
    8. Sylvain Benoit & Jean-Edouard Colliard & Christophe Hurlin & Christophe Pérignon, 2017. "Where the Risks Lie: A Survey on Systemic Risk," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(1), pages 109-152.
    9. Blanco Barroso, Joao & Barbone Gonzalez, Rodrigo & Peydró, José-Luis & Nazar van Doornik, Bernardus, 2019. "Countercyclical Liquidity Policy and Credit Cycles: Evidence from Macroprudential and Monetary Policy in Brazil," EconStor Preprints 216792, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    10. Zhiguo He & Péter Kondor, 2016. "Inefficient Investment Waves," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 735-780, March.
    11. Michael Peneder, 2022. "Digitization and the evolution of money as a social technology of account," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 175-203, January.
    12. Eric Monnet & Miklos Vari, 2019. "Liquidity Ratios as Monetary Policy Tools: Some Historical Lessons for Macroprudential Policy," IMF Working Papers 2019/176, International Monetary Fund.
    13. Augusto de la Torre & Alain Ize, 2016. "The Conceptual Foundations of Macroprudential Policy: A Roadmap," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 333-352, December.
    14. Keshtgar, Nafiseh & Pahlavani, Mosayeb & Mirjalili, Seyed Hossein, 2020. "The Impact of Macroprudential Policies on the Vulnerability of the Banking System: Dynamic Panel Model," Journal of Money and Economy, Monetary and Banking Research Institute, Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, vol. 15(4), pages 357-379, October.
    15. Musgrave, Ralph S., 2017. "Privately issued money reduces GDP," MPRA Paper 78896, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Cesa-Bianchi, Ambrogio & Rebucci, Alessandro, 2017. "Does easing monetary policy increase financial instability?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 111-125.
    17. Chang Ma, 2020. "Self-regulation versus government regulation: an externality view," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 166-183, December.
    18. Javier Bianchi & Emine Boz & Enrique Gabriel Mendoza, 2012. "Macroprudential Policy in a Fisherian Model of Financial Innovation," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 60(2), pages 223-269, July.
    19. Bierbrauer, Felix, 2014. "Tax incidence for fragile financial markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 107-125.
    20. Korinek, Anton & Sandri, Damiano, 2016. "Capital controls or macroprudential regulation?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(S1), pages 27-42.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Basel III; debt deflation; endogenous money; financial regulation; global financial crisis; limited purpose banking; maturity mismatch; narrow money; Pigouvian taxes; ring fencing; systemic financial risk; systemic financial externalities; Tobin tax;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:ifweej:20137. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iwkiede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.