Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Measuring conflict and power in strategic settings

Contents:

Author Info

  • Giovanni Rossi

    ()
    (Department of Computer Science, University of Bologna Mura Anteo Zamboni, Italy)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This is a quantitative approach to measuring conflict and power in strategic settings: noncooperative games (with cardinal or ordinal utilities) and blockings (without any preference specification). A (0, 1)-ranged index is provided, taking its minimum on common interest games, and its maximum on a newly introduced class termed “full conflict” games.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.ioz.pwr.wroc.pl/boid/artykuly/2-2009/art-6-rossi.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Organization and Management in its journal Operations Research and Decisions.

    Volume (Year): 2 (2009)
    Issue (Month): ()
    Pages: 75-104

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:wut:journl:v:2:y:2009:p:75-104

    Contact details of provider:
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.ioz.pwr.wroc.pl/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: strategic game; conflict; coalitional game; power index;

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Moulin, Hervé & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/13220, Paris Dauphine University.
    2. Luca Anderlini, 1995. "Communication, Computability and Common Interest Games," Game Theory and Information 9510003, EconWPA.
    3. Tan, Jonathan H.W. & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2008. "Groups, cooperation and conflict in games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-17, February.
    4. Gary Bornstein, 2002. "Intergroup conflict: Individual, group and collective interests," Discussion Paper Series dp297, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    5. Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
    6. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, September.
    7. Van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Strategic equilibrium," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 41, pages 1521-1596 Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wut:journl:v:2:y:2009:p:75-104. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Piotr Wawrzynowski).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.