Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Rationale for IPO Lockup Agreements: Agency or Signaling?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Fei Gao

    ()
    (Kelley College of Business, Hardin-Simmons University, Abilene, TX 79698, USA)

  • Mazhar A. Siddiqi

    (College of Business, University of North Texas, USA)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Most Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) feature share lockup agreements, which prohibit insiders and other pre-IPO shareholders from selling their shares for a specified period of time following IPO. We explore possible reasons why some IPO firms voluntarily agree to have a much longer lockup period than other firms. We find evidence that lockup agreements are used to control agency costs. Longer lockups are significantly related to inferior long-run returns and this relationship is stronger for firms that have less reputable underwriters. We find no evidence that lockup agreements are used to signal firm quality and we are unable to relate firm quality, as measured by long-run returns, to information asymmetry variables.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.worldscinet.com/cgi-bin/details.cgi?type=pdf&id=pii:S0219091512500130
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: http://www.worldscinet.com/cgi-bin/details.cgi?type=html&id=pii:S0219091512500130
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies.

    Volume (Year): 15 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 03 ()
    Pages: 1250013-1-1250013-18

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:wsi:rpbfmp:v:15:y:2012:i:03:p:1250013-1-1250013-18

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.worldscinet.com/rpbfmp/rpbfmp.shtml

    Order Information:
    Email:

    Related research

    Keywords: IPO; lockup; agency; signaling;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wsi:rpbfmp:v:15:y:2012:i:03:p:1250013-1-1250013-18. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tai Tone Lim).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.