Does Stock Misvaluation Differentiate the Motives for Takeovers?
AbstractWe use pre-offer market valuations to examine the motives for takeovers under the misvaluation theory. According to previous literature, the motives for merger and acquisition consist of synergy, agency and hubris. We find that overvalued acquirers paying by cash have the motives of synergy and hubris. However, overvalued acquirers paying by stock have the motives of agency and hubris. On the other hand, the motive of undervalued acquirers paying by cash is only hubris. Lastly, the motives of those undervalued acquirers paying by stock are synergy and hubris. In this study, we provide the empirical evidence to show that acquirers' stock misevaluation and their payment methods will differentiate the motives for takeovers.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies.
Volume (Year): 12 (2009)
Issue (Month): 03 ()
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Web page: http://www.worldscinet.com/rpbfmp/rpbfmp.shtml
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
- G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
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