Cash Holdings, Corporate Governance Structure and Firm Valuation
AbstractFirms with higher board independence, smaller boards, and lower expected managerial entrenchment, have lower cash holdings. We find that the positive association between cash holdings and managerial entrenchment is mitigated by stronger board structures. Specifically, in firms with higher expected managerial entrenchment, those with higher proportion of outside director on the board and smaller board size have lower cash holdings. We also find that firm value is negatively associated with cash levels. The negative association between firm value and cash holdings is more pronounced in firms with (i) lower proportion of outside directors, (ii) larger boards and (iii) higher expected managerial entrenchment. For firms with both high cash holdings and high expected managerial entrenchment, investors additionally discount the valuation of firms with lower proportion of outside directors and those with larger boards.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies.
Volume (Year): 12 (2009)
Issue (Month): 03 ()
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Web page: http://www.worldscientific.com/worldscinet/rpbfmp
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
- G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
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