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Agency Costs of Controlling Shareholders' Share Collateral with Taiwan Evidence

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Author Info

  • Anlin Chen

    ()
    (Department of Business Management, National Sun Yat-Sen University, Kaohsiung 804, Taiwan)

  • Lanfeng Kao

    ()
    (Department of Finance, National University of Kaohsiung, Kaohsiung 811, Taiwan)

  • Yi-Kai Chen

    ()
    (Department of Finance, National University of Kaohsiung, Kaohsiung 811, Taiwan)

Abstract

Controlling shareholders' share collateral is a new source of the deviation of cash flow rights and control rights leading to minority shareholder expropriation. However, controlling shareholders' share collateral is not forbidden and has not received particular restriction leading to its popularity in the capital markets. Neglecting the potential agency costs resulting from controlling shareholders' share collateral would hurt the interests of creditors and minority shareholders. We need legal regulation on controlling shareholders' share collateral to reinforce corporate governance mechanism to protect the interests of creditors and minority shareholders.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies.

Volume (Year): 10 (2007)
Issue (Month): 02 ()
Pages: 173-191

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Handle: RePEc:wsi:rpbfmp:v:10:y:2007:i:02:p:173-191

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Related research

Keywords: Agency costs; controlling shareholder; moral hazard; share collateral;

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