AbstractConsider the following social choice problem. A group of individuals seek to classify the elements of X as belonging in one of two sets. The individuals may disagree as to how the elements of X should be classified, and so an aggregation rule is applied to determine a compromise outcome. We require that the social classification should not be imposed, nor should it be manipulable. We prove that the only aggregation rules satisfying these properties are dictatorships.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal New Mathematics and Natural Computation.
Volume (Year): 08 (2012)
Issue (Month): 02 ()
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Web page: http://www.worldscinet.com/nmnc/nmnc.shtml
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