The Rationality Of Fuzzy Choice Functions
AbstractIf we assume that the preferences of a set of political actors are not cyclic, we would like to know if their collective choices are rationalizable. Given a fuzzy choice rule, do they collectively choose an alternative from the set of undominated alternatives? We consider necessary and sufficient conditions for a partially acyclic fuzzy choice function to be rationalizable. We find that certain fuzzy choice functions that satisfy conditions α and β are rationalizable. Furthermore, any fuzzy choice function that satisfies these two conditions also satisfies Arrow and Warp.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal New Mathematics and Natural Computation.
Volume (Year): 04 (2008)
Issue (Month): 03 ()
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Web page: http://www.worldscinet.com/nmnc/nmnc.shtml
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