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The Assignment Game With Negative Externalities And Bounded Rationality

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  • KIMMO ERIKSSON

    (Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden; Division of Applied Mathematics, School of Education, Culture and Communication, Mälardalen University, Box 883, SE-721 23 Västerås, Sweden)

  • FREDRIK JANSSON

    ()
    (Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden; Division of Applied Mathematics, School of Education, Culture and Communication, Mälardalen University, Box 883, SE-721 23 Västerås, Sweden)

  • THOMAS VETANDER

    (Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden; Division of Applied Mathematics, School of Education, Culture and Communication, Mälardalen University, Box 883, SE-721 23 Västerås, Sweden)

Abstract

We introduce negative externalities in the form of ill will among the players of the classic two-sided assignment game of Shapley and Shubik, by letting each player's utility be negatively correlated with the payoff of all the players in his group. The new game is very complex, but under a certain assumption of bounded rationality we derive a straightforward notion of stable outcomes as certain conjectural equilibria. We prove that several well-known properties of the set of stable outcomes in the assignment game carry over to this new game.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.

Volume (Year): 13 (2011)
Issue (Month): 04 ()
Pages: 443-459

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Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:13:y:2011:i:04:p:443-459

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Related research

Keywords: Two-sided matching; stable outcome; bounded rationality; assignment game; social preferences; negative externalities; C71; C78; D62;

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Cited by:
  1. Gudmundsson, Jens & Habis, Helga, 2013. "Assignment Games with Externalities," Working Papers 2013:27, Lund University, Department of Economics.

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