Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

On Equilibrium Refinement For Discontinuous Games


Author Info


    (Department of Economics, Rutgers University, 75 Hamilton Street, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA)


In moving from finite-action to infinite-action games, standard refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept cease to satisfy certain "natural" properties. For instance, perfect equilibria in compact, continuous games need not be admissible. This paper highlights additional properties of two standard refinement specifications that are not inherited by supersets of the set of finite games. The analysis reveals the following about the behavior of perfectness and strategic stability within a class of (possibly) discontinuous games: (1) Equilibria that assign positive probability to the interior of the set of strategies weakly dominated for some player can be chosen; (2) nonadmissible equilibria need not be ruled out when they are weakly dominated by admissible perfect equilibria; and (3) nonadmissible equilibria may be selected when admissible equilibria are ruled out.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

File URL:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.

Volume (Year): 13 (2011)
Issue (Month): 03 ()
Pages: 269-280

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:13:y:2011:i:03:p:269-280

Contact details of provider:
Web page:

Order Information:

Related research

Keywords: Discontinuous normal-form game; limit admissible equilibrium; weakly dominated strategy; trembling-hand perfect equilibrium; strategic stability; C72;

Find related papers by JEL classification:


No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.



This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


Access and download statistics


When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:13:y:2011:i:03:p:269-280. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tai Tone Lim).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.