Nash Networks With Imperfect Reliability And Heterogeous Players
AbstractThis paper combines the imperfect reliability model of Bala and Goyal [2000b] with the heterogeneous player model of Galeotti et al. . We compare existence, characterization and efficiency results in the resulting framework with the results in other frameworks allowing for imperfect reliability or heterogeneity. Specifically, we compare our work with the framework of Haller and Sarangi  which allows for heterogeneity in link reliability but assumes that players are homogeneous. We find, by contrast with their paper, that non existence of Nash networks is possible in our framework even if the population is very small. Moreover, although the incentives of players to maintain (or delete) links are different, in both frameworks there exist parameters such that every essential network is strict Nash and efficient.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.
Volume (Year): 13 (2011)
Issue (Month): 02 ()
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- B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
- C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
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- Billand, P. & Bravard, C. & Kamphorst, J. & Sarangi, S., 2013.
"Confirming information flows in networks,"
2013-06, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
- Billand, Pascal & Bravard, Christophe & Kamphorst, Jurjen J.A. & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2013. "Confirming Information Flows in Networks," MPRA Paper 45835, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sudipta Sarangi & Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Jurjen Kamphorst, . "Confirming Information Flows in Networks," Departmental Working Papers 2012-02, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
- Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Jurjen Kamphorst & Sudipta Sarangi, 2012. "Confirming Information Flows in Networks," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-019/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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