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Stable Cooperation Under Environmental Constraints

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Author Info

  • NADEZHDA KOZLOVSKAYA

    ()
    (St. Petersburg University, Universitetski pr. 35, St. Petersburg, 198504, Russia)

  • NIKOLAY ZENKEVICH

    ()
    (St. Petersburg University, Volkhovski per. 1-3, St. Petersburg, 199004, Russia)

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    Abstract

    A game-theoretic model of territorial environmental production under Cournot competition is studied. The process is modeled as cooperative differential game. The stable distribution mechanism of the common cooperative benefit among players is proposed. We proved that the cooperative total stock of accumulated pollution is strictly less then the pollution under Nash equilibrium for the whole duration of the game. We design a stable Shapley value as a cooperative solution, which is time-consistent. The Shapley value is also strategic stable and satisfies the irrational-behavior-proofness condition. The numerical example is given.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.

    Volume (Year): 12 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 04 ()
    Pages: 453-470

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    Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:12:y:2010:i:04:p:453-470

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    Related research

    Keywords: Differential game; differential cooperative game; dynamic programming; Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation; Shapley value; Nash equilibrium; perfect equilibrium; stability of cooperative solution; time-consistency; strategic stability; irrational-behavior-proofness condition; 49N70; 91A12;

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