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On Cooperative Games Related To Market Situations And Auctions

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  • RODICA BRANZEI

    ()
    ("Alexander Ioan Cuza" University, Faculty of Computer Science, 11, Carol I Bd., 700483 Ia┼či, Romania)

  • VITO FRAGNELLI

    ()
    (University of Eastern Piedmont, Department of Advanced Sciences and Technologies (DiSTA), Via V. Bellini 25/G, 15100 Alessandria, Italy)

  • ANA MECA

    ()
    (University Miguel Hernandez of Elche, Operations Research Center and Department of Statistics, Mathematics and Computer Sciences, Edificio Torretamarit, Avda. de la Universidad s/n 03202 Elche (Alicante), Spain)

  • STEF TIJS

    ()
    (CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands)

Abstract

We consider a market situation with two corners. One corner consists of a single seller with one object, and the other corner consists of potential buyers who all want the object. We suppose that the valuations of the object for the different buyers are known by all of them. Then two types of cooperative games, which we call market games and ring games, corresponding to such market situations are considered.Market games are related to special total big boss games, while ring games are related to special convex games, the peer group games. It turns out that there exists a duality relation between the market game and the ring game arising from the same two-corner market situation. For both classes of games relevant solution concepts are studied.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.

Volume (Year): 11 (2009)
Issue (Month): 04 ()
Pages: 459-470

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Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:04:p:459-470

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Related research

Keywords: Market games; ring games; one-object auction situations; big boss games; peer group games; 91A12; 90B05; C71;

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Cited by:
  1. Kamijo, Yoshio & Kongo, Takumi, 2012. "Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 216(3), pages 638-646.

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