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Nash Equilibrium In Two-Sided Mate Choice Problem

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  • VLADIMIR MAZALOV

    ()
    (Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Center of RAS, Petrozavodsk, 185910, Russia)

  • ANNA FALKO

    ()
    (Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Center of RAS, Petrozavodsk, 185910, Russia)

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    Abstract

    We consider a two-sided search model in which individuals from two distinct populations would like to form a long-term relationship with a member of the other population. The individual choice is determined by the quality of the partner. Initially the quality of individuals in the population is uniform. At every stage the individuals randomly matched from their populations recognize the quality of the partner. If they accept each other they create a couple and leave the game. The partner's quality is the payoff. Unmatched players go to the next stage. At the last stage the individuals accept any partner. Each player aims to maximize her/his expected payoff. In this paper explicit formulas for Nash equilibrium strategies are derived. Also, the model with incoming individuals is analyzed.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.

    Volume (Year): 10 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 04 ()
    Pages: 421-435

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    Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:04:p:421-435

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    Related research

    Keywords: Best-choice problem; mutual choice; multistage game; optimal strategy; Nash equilibrium; Subject Classification: 91A60; Subject Classification: 60G40; Subject Classification: 91A20;

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    Cited by:
    1. Alpern, S. & Katrantzi, I. & Ramsey, D.M., 2013. "Partnership formation with age-dependent preferences," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 225(1), pages 91-99.
    2. Ramsey, David M., 2012. "Partnership formation based on multiple traits," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 216(3), pages 624-637.

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