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Competing For Endogenous Information In An Irreversible Environmental Resource Problem: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

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Author Info

  • GIUSEPPE ATTANASI

    ()
    (LERNA, Toulouse School of Economics, Manufacture des Tabacs, 21 Allee de Brienne, Toulouse, 31000, France; LEE/LINEEX, Universitat Jaume I, Campus Riu Sec, Castellon, 12071, Spain)

  • ALDO MONTESANO

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Bocconi University, via U. Gobbi, 5, Milan, 20136, Italy)

Abstract

The paper analyzes strategic behavior in a two-stage environmental choice problem under different information scenarios. Given uncertainty about environmental cost and irreversibility of development, "learning without destroying" emerges from strategic competition when information is endogenous and publicly available. This happens since agents trade off the higher payoff of being the first-mover against the potentially free acquisition of endogenous information without developing their own environmental endowment. We prove that in a 2X2 dynamic environmental game with payoff uncertainty and irreversibility publicly available endogenous information could lead players to destroy less in aggregate terms with respect to the case in which information is exogenous.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.

Volume (Year): 10 (2008)
Issue (Month): 03 ()
Pages: 229-243

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Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:p:229-243

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Related research

Keywords: Public endogenous information; irreversibility; testing value; Subject Classification: C72; Subject Classification: D81; Subject Classification: Q32;

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Cited by:
  1. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Montesano, Aldo, 2010. "Testing Value vs Waiting Value in Environmental Decisions under Uncertainty," TSE Working Papers 10-154, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

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