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Variational Stability Of Social Nash Equilibria

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  • JACQUELINE MORGAN

    ()
    (Dipartimento di Matematica e Statistica, Università di Napoli Federico II, via Cinthia 80126 Napoli, Italy)

  • VINCENZO SCALZO

    ()
    (Dipartimento di Matematica e Statistica, Università di Napoli Federico II, via Cinthia 80126 Napoli, Italy)

Abstract

New results on the variational stability of social Nash equilibria are obtained using the class of sequentially pseudocontinuous functions. This class of functions strictly includes the class of sequentially continuous functions and finds a natural motivation in the framework of Choice and Economic Theory since it characterizes the continuity of the preference relations on first countable topological spaces. We investigate the connections with previous results and we show that it is not possible to improve our results further on.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.

Volume (Year): 10 (2008)
Issue (Month): 01 ()
Pages: 17-24

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Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:01:p:17-24

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Related research

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; social Nash equilibrium; variational stability; abstract economy; sequentially pseudocontinuous functions; 91A10; 34D10; 49K40; 58K55;

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Cited by:
  1. Scalzo, Vincenzo, 2012. "Discontinuous stable games and efficient Nash equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 387-389.
  2. Giuseppe De Marco & Maria Romaniello, 2013. "Games Equilibria and the Variational Representation of Preferences," CSEF Working Papers 336, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  3. Giuseppe De Marco & Maria Romaniello, 2013. "On the Stability of Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games under Ambiguity," CSEF Working Papers 332, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.

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