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On Bargaining Based Point Solution To Cooperative Tu Games


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    (Ramanujan Institute for Advanced Study in Mathematics, University of Madras, Chennai — 600 005, India)


    (Ramanujan Institute for Advanced Study in Mathematics, University of Madras, Chennai — 600 005, India)


    (Indian Statistical Institute, Nelson Manickam Road, Chennai 600 029, Chennai)

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    Consider the cooperative coalition games with side payments. Bargaining sets are calculated for all possible coalition structures to obtain a collection of imputations rather than single imputation. Our aim is to obtain a single payoff vector, which is acceptable by all players of the game under grand coalition. Though Shapely value is a single imputation, it is based on fair divisions rather than bargaining considerations. So, we present a method to obtain a single imputation based on bargaining considerations.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.

    Volume (Year): 09 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 02 ()
    Pages: 361-374

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    Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:361-374

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    Keywords: Cooperative game in characteristic function form; transferable utility; coalition; core; imputation; bargaining set; bargaining value; 91A05; 91A06; 91A12;

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