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Measuring The Power Of Parties Within Government Coalitions

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  • HARALD WIESE

    ()
    (Universität Leipzig, Postfach 920, 04009 Leipzig, Germany)

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    Abstract

    The paper presents a coalition-structure value that is meant to capture outside options of players in a cooperative game. It deviates from the Aumann-Drèze value by violating the null-player axiom. We use this value as a power index and apply it to weighted majority games.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.

    Volume (Year): 09 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 02 ()
    Pages: 307-322

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    Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:307-322

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    Related research

    Keywords: Power; government coalition; outside option; Aumann-Drèze value; Shapley value; null-player axiom; JEL Classification: C71; JEL Classification: H1;

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    Cited by:
    1. Piolatto, Amedeo, 2011. "Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: Which is most representative of voters?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 311-327, June.
    2. Andreas Tutic & Stefan Pfau & André Casajus, 2011. "Experiments on bilateral bargaining in markets," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 529-546, April.
    3. Casajus, André, 2009. "Outside options, component efficiency, and stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 49-61, January.
    4. Tobias Hiller, 2011. "Effizienz und Stabilität von Zweckverbänden," Jahrbuch für Regionalwissenschaft, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 1-9, June.
    5. André Casajus, 2010. "Another characterization of the Owen value without the additivity axiom," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 523-536, October.
    6. Casajus, André & Tutić, Andreas, 2013. "Nash bargaining, Shapley threats, and outside options," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 262-267.
    7. Tobias Hiller, 2011. "A note on χ-values," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 58(4), pages 433-438, December.
    8. Casajus, André, 2008. "On the stability of coalition structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 271-274, August.

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