Bankruptcy Rules And Coalitional Manipulation
AbstractIn this paper, we study the immunity of bankruptcy rules to manipulation via merging or splitting agents' claims. We focus on the TAL-family of bankruptcy rules (Moreno-Ternero & Villar, 2005), a one-parameter family encompassing three classical rules: the Talmud (T) rule, the constrained equal-awards (A) rule and the constrained equal-losses (L) rule. We show that all rules within the TAL-family are partially non-manipulable and identify the domain of problems where each rule is either non-manipulable by merging or non-manipulable by splitting. We also show that they can be ranked in terms of their relative non-manipulability, according to the parameter that generates the family.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.
Volume (Year): 09 (2007)
Issue (Month): 01 ()
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- B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
- C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics
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- Biung-Ghi Ju, 2004. "Coalitional Manipulation on Networks," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200410, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004.
- Biung-Ghi Ju, 2004. "Coalitional Manipulation on Communication Network," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 563, Econometric Society.
- JU, Biung-Ghi & MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D., 2006.
"Progressivity, inequality reduction and merging-proofness in taxation,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2006075, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Biung-Ghi Ju & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2006. "Progressivity, Inequality Reduction, and Merging-Proofness in Taxation," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200603, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2006.
- Biung-Ghi Ju & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2009.
"Progressive and merging-proof taxation,"
2009-7, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
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