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Gathering Information By A Partially Informed Agent

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Author Info
DONGSOO SHIN () (Department of Economics, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara CA, 95053, USA)
SUNGHO YUN () (Department of Economics, Hanyang University at Ansan, Kyunggi-do 425-791, South Korea)

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Abstract

This paper considers an agency contracting with multiple tasks. The agent is privately informed on some tasks, but he must gather information on the other. We show that depending on the cost to gather information, task assignment is employed as an instrument to induce information gathering, or as an instrument to induce a truthful report.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.

Volume (Year): 08 (2006)
Issue (Month): 04 ()
Pages: 675-694
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Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:p:675-694

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Related research
Keywords: Principal-agent; information gathering; partially informed agent; JEL Classification: D82; JEL Classification: L23;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-9.

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