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On The Chacteristic Numbers Of Voting Games

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Author Info

  • MATHIEU MARTIN

    ()
    (THEMA, Departments of Economics, Université de Cergy Pontoise, 33 Boulevard du Port, 95011 Cergy Pontoise cedex, France)

  • VINCENT MERLIN

    ()
    (CREM, CNRS and University of Caen, Faculté de Sciences Economiques et de Gestion, 19 rue Claude Bloch, 14032 Caen Cedex, France)

Abstract

This paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper voting game. We present an upper bound on the number of alternatives which guarantees the non emptiness of this solution concept. We show that this bound is greater than or equal to the one given by Le Breton and Salles (1990) for quota games.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.

Volume (Year): 08 (2006)
Issue (Month): 04 ()
Pages: 643-654

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Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:p:643-654

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Related research

Keywords: Voting game; core; stability set; JEL Classification: C7; JEL Classification: D7;

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References

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  1. Le Breton, M & Salles, M, 1990. "The Stability Set of Voting Games: Classification and Genericity Results," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 111-27.
  2. Le Breton, Michel, 1990. "On some combinatorial problems arising in the theory of voting games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 179-193, April.
  3. Peleg, Bezalel, 1978. "Consistent Voting Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 153-61, January.
  4. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1980. "Stability of decision systems under majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 150-159, October.
  5. Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-36, May.
  6. Mathieu Martin, 2000. "A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 559-565.
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Cited by:
  1. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2008. "Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction," MPRA Paper 11728, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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