This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Manager, Worker, Rentier And Government: Markov And Non-Markovian Play

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
ROMAR CORREA () (Department of Economics,University of Mumbai, Vidyanagari, Mumbai 400 098, India)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We decompose the representative agent into her manager, worker and rentier selves. The criterion is the information set of each of the 'incarnations' at every stage of a repeated game. The rentier's information set includes anticipating information while the information set of the other agents is feedback. The equilibrium that results is, therefore, not subgame perfect. Enter the government that produces a good that complements the existing good. It is financed by the issue of money that substitutes for the asset. The enlargement of the state space of the game induces cooperation between the agents.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.worldscinet.com/cgi-bin/details.cgi?type=pdf&id=pii:S0219198906001004
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
File URL: http://www.worldscinet.com/cgi-bin/details.cgi?type=html&id=pii:S0219198906001004
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.

Volume (Year): 08 (2006)
Issue (Month): 03 ()
Pages: 429-436
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:03:p:429-436

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.worldscinet.com/igtr/igtr.shtml

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Tai Tone Lim).

Related research
Keywords: Markov and non-Markovian equilibrium; coordination games; JEL Classification Number: C73; JEL Classification Number: E13;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All the bibliographic data shown here has been contributed by volunteers, thereby helping to keep this service free.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-9.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.