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Generalized Cores And Stable Sets For Fuzzy Games

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Author Info

  • S. MUTO

    (Department of Value and Decision Science, Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan)

  • S. ISHIHARA

    (Department of Value and Decision Science, Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan)

  • E. FUKUDA

    ()
    (Department of Value and Decision Science, Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan)

  • S. H. TIJS

    (Center and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands)

  • R. BRÂNZEI

    (Faculty of Computer Science, 'Alexandru Ioan Cuza' University, Iasi, Romania)

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    Abstract

    Core elements (a la Aubin) of a fuzzy game can be associated with additive separable supporting functions of fuzzy games. Generalized cores whose elements consist of more general separable supporting functions of the game are introduced and studied. While the Aubin core of unanimity games can be empty, the generalized core of unanimity games is nonempty. Properties of the generalized cores and their relations to stable sets are studied. For convex fuzzy games interesting properties are found such as the fact that the generalized core is a unique generalized stable set.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.

    Volume (Year): 08 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 01 ()
    Pages: 95-109

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    Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:95-109

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    Related research

    Keywords: Cooperative game; core; stable set; decision making; fuzzy coalition; fuzzy game; dominance core; convex fuzzy game; 90D12; 03E72;

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    Cited by:
    1. Maria Gabriella Graziano & Claudia Meo & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2013. "Stable Sets for Asymmetric Information Economies," CSEF Working Papers 333, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.

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