References listed on IDEAS
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1. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-83, December.
2. Joel Sobel, 1990. "Fixed-Equilibrium Rationalizability in Signaling Games," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 90-13, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
   Other versions:
   • Sobel, Joel & Stole, Lars & Zapater, Inigo, 1990. "Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 304-331, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Grossman, S J & Hart, O D, 1980. " Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(2), pages 323-34, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2002. "Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 356-391, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Feinberg, Yossi, 2000. "Characterizing Common Priors in the Form of Posteriors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 127-179, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
7. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999. "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 188-230, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Pierpaolo Battigalli, . "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Working Papers 111, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
8. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000116, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1519, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
9. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 2003. "Rationalizability in infinite, dynamic games with incomplete information," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-38, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Faruk Gul, 1998. "A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 923-928, July.
11. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000593, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
    • Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann, 2004. "Robust Mechanism Design," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm380, Yale School of Management. [Downloadable!]
    • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000035, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1990. "Strategic Information Revelation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(1), pages 25-47, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Dekel, E. & Wolinsky, A., 2000. "Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions," Papers 2000-13, Tel Aviv.
    Other versions:
    • Eddie Dekel & Asher Wolinsky, 2000. "Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First Price Discrete Auctions," Discussion Papers 1308, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    • Eddie Dekel & Asher Wolinsky, 2001. "Rationalizable outcomes of large independent private-value first-price discrete auctions," Discussion Papers 1321, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    • Dekel, E. & Wolinsky, A., 2000. "Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions," Papers 00-13, Tel Aviv.
14. N. M. Kiefer, 1998. "Reply," Econometric Reviews, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 7(2), pages 161-163. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
    Other versions:
    • Harsanyi, John C., 1994. "Games with Incomplete Information," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee. [Downloadable!]
16. In-Koo Cho, 2004. "Monotonicity and Rationalizability in Large Uniform Price and Double Auctions," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000076, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
17. Watson, Joel, 1996. "Reputation in Repeated Games with No Discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 82-109, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Interim Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000526, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Interim Rationalizability," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2064, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
19. Tai-Wei Hu, 2004. "General Rationalizability and Its Robustness for Strategic Form Games with Incomplete Information," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 771, Econometric Society.
20. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Peski, Marcin, 2006. "Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 19-65, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Jeffrey C. Ely & Marcin Peski, 2005. "Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000817, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Jeffrey C. Ely & Marcin Peski, . "Hierarchies Of Belief And Interim Rationalizability," Discussion Papers 1388, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
22. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Joel Watson, 1997. "On "Reputation" Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 369-374, March.
    Other versions:
    • Pierpaolo Battigalli & Joel Watson, 1995. "On Reputation Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 95-26, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
23. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
24. repec:bep:theadv:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1073-1073 is not listed on IDEAS
    Other versions:
    • P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
25. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, 1999. "How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 409-434. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
26. Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1391-1402, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
27. Watson, Joel, 1993. "A "Reputation" Refinement without Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 199-205, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
28. Cho, In-Koo, 1994. "Stationarity, Rationalizability and Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(2), pages 357-74, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
29. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2003. "Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 38-72, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
30. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J., 1999. "A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 279-285, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Perry, M. & Reny, P.J., 1995. "A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Papers 9581, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
31. Watson, Joel, 1998. "Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(3), pages 573-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Joel Watson, 1995. "Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 94-13r, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
32. L. G. Godfrey & A. R. Tremayne, 1998. "Reply," Econometric Reviews, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 7(1), pages 63-64. [Downloadable!] (restricted)