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Proportionality And Non-Manipulability In Bankruptcy Problems

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  • JUAN D. MORENO-TERNERO

    ()
    (Universidad de Málaga and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, 34 Voie du Roman Pays, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

We explore the relationship between proportionality and manipulation (via merging or splitting agents' claims) in bankruptcy problems. We provide an alternative proof to the well-known result that, in an unrestricted domain, immunity to manipulation is equivalent to requiring proportional division. We show that this result also holds for restricted (but sufficiently rich) domains, such as the domain of simple problems and the domain of zero-normalized problems. Finally, we characterize two adjustments of the proportional rule by combining non-manipulabilty on these domains and the usual axioms of independence of claims truncation and composition from minimal rights.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.

Volume (Year): 08 (2006)
Issue (Month): 01 ()
Pages: 127-139

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Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:127-139

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Related research

Keywords: Bankruptcy problems; proportional allocation; manipulation via merging or splitting; axiomatic characterizations; JEL Classification Code: D63;

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Cited by:
  1. Karagözoğlu Emin, 2010. "A Noncooperative Approach to Bankruptcy Problems with an Endogenous Estate," Research Memorandum 027, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  2. Arantza Estevez-Fernandez & Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers, 2010. "A Note on Passepartout Problems," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-031/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  3. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2004. "Coalitional Manipulation on Networks," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200410, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004.
  4. Karagozoglu, Emin, 2008. "A Noncooperative Approach to Bankruptcy Problems with an Endogenous Estate," Research Memorandum 031, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  5. Arantza Estevez-Fernandez & Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers, 2010. "A Note on Passepartout Problems," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-031/1, Tinbergen Institute.

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