Proportionality And Non-Manipulability In Bankruptcy Problems
AbstractWe explore the relationship between proportionality and manipulation (via merging or splitting agents' claims) in bankruptcy problems. We provide an alternative proof to the well-known result that, in an unrestricted domain, immunity to manipulation is equivalent to requiring proportional division. We show that this result also holds for restricted (but sufficiently rich) domains, such as the domain of simple problems and the domain of zero-normalized problems. Finally, we characterize two adjustments of the proportional rule by combining non-manipulabilty on these domains and the usual axioms of independence of claims truncation and composition from minimal rights.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.
Volume (Year): 08 (2006)
Issue (Month): 01 ()
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Web page: http://www.worldscinet.com/igtr/igtr.shtml
Other versions of this item:
- MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D., . "Proportionality and non-manipulability in bankruptcy problems," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1898, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
- C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics
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