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The Dutta-Ray Solution On The Class Of Convex Games: A Generalization And Monotonicity Properties

Author

Listed:
  • JENS LETH HOUGAARD

    (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestraede 6, 1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark)

  • BEZALEL PELEG

    (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Centre of Rationality, Interaction and Decision Theory, Givat Ram, Feldman Building, 91904 Jerusalem, Israel)

  • LARS PETER ØSTERDAL

    (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestraede 6, 1455 copenhagen K, Denmark)

Abstract

This paper considers generalized Lorenz-maximal solutions in the core of a convex TU-game and demonstrates that such solutions satisfy coalitional monotonicity and population monotonicity.

Suggested Citation

  • Jens Leth Hougaard & Bezalel Peleg & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2005. "The Dutta-Ray Solution On The Class Of Convex Games: A Generalization And Monotonicity Properties," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(04), pages 431-442.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:04:n:s0219198905000624
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198905000624
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    Cited by:

    1. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2010. "Monotonicity of social welfare optima," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 392-402, November.
    2. Calleja, Pedro & Llerena, Francesc & Sudhölter, Peter, 2021. "Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray’s egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Convex games; core solutions; generalized Lorenz-maxima; coalitional monotonicity; population monotonicity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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