Evolution With Endogenous Mutations
AbstractBergin and Lipman (1996) prove that equilibrium selection in the evolutionary dynamics of Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993), is not robust to variations in mutation rates across states. Specifically, a risk dominant equilibrium can be selected against if mutation rates are higher in its basin of attraction than elsewhere. Van Damme and Weibull (1998) model mutations as a compromise between payoff losses and control costs, which implies lower mutation rates in the risk dominant equilibrium. This paper argues that this result is not driven by control costs, but by players focusing on payoff losses when choosing mutation rates.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.
Volume (Year): 07 (2005)
Issue (Month): 02 ()
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