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Demonstrating Worker Quality Through Strategic Absenteeism

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Author Info
WILLIAM T. HARBAUGH () (University of Oregon, 1285, Eugene, Oregon 97403, USA)
ANNE VAN DEN NOUWELAND () (University of Oregon, 1285, Eugene, Oregon 97403, USA)

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Abstract

Determining the productivity of individual workers engaged in team production is difficult. Monitoring expenses may be high, or the observable output of the entire team may be some single product. One way to collect information about individual productivity is to observe how total output changes when the composition of the team changes. While some employers may explicitly shift workers from team to team for exactly this reason, the most common reasons for changes in team composition are at least partly voluntary: vacation time and sick days. In this paper, we develop a model of optimal absenteeism by employees which accounts for strategic interactions between employees. We assume the employer uses both observed changes in output and the strategies of the employees to form beliefs about a given worker's type. We argue that the model we develop is applicable to a variety of workplace situations where signaling models are not, because it allows a worker's decisions to provide information about other workers, as well as about himself.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.

Volume (Year): 07 (2005)
Issue (Month): 02 ()
Pages: 189-209
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Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:02:p:189-209

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Related research
Keywords: Absenteeism; non-cooperative games; signaling; teamwork; JEL codes: C72; JEL codes: J22;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Rebitzer, James B & Taylor, Lowell J, 1995. "Do Labor Markets Provide Enough Short-Hour Jobs? An Analysis of Work Hours and Work Incentives," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 257-73, April.
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  2. Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-80, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Landers, Renee M & Rebitzer, James B & Taylor, Lowell J, 1996. "Rat Race Redux: Adverse Selection in the Determination of Work Hours in Law Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 329-48, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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