Deadline Effects In Sequential Bargaining — An Experimental Study
AbstractThis paper reports on an experiment designed to explore the robustness of the deadline effect in multi period bargaining games using constant and decreasing pies, different time horizons, and constant and alternating roles. Our results indicate that decreasing pies and alternating roles lead to earlier agreements (i.e., attenuate the deadline effect) although only alternating roles significantly reduce the number of conflicts.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.
Volume (Year): 07 (2005)
Issue (Month): 02 ()
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Web page: http://www.worldscinet.com/igtr/igtr.shtml
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
- C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics
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