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Deadline Effects In Sequential Bargaining — An Experimental Study

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Author Info

  • WERNER GÜTH

    (Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Group, Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany)

  • M. VITTORIA LEVATI

    ()
    (Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Group, Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany)

  • BORIS MACIEJOVSKY

    (Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Group, Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany)

Abstract

This paper reports on an experiment designed to explore the robustness of the deadline effect in multi period bargaining games using constant and decreasing pies, different time horizons, and constant and alternating roles. Our results indicate that decreasing pies and alternating roles lead to earlier agreements (i.e., attenuate the deadline effect) although only alternating roles significantly reduce the number of conflicts.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.

Volume (Year): 07 (2005)
Issue (Month): 02 ()
Pages: 117-135

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Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:02:p:117-135

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Related research

Keywords: Ultimatum game; deadline effect; decreasing pie;

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Cited by:
  1. William Fuchs & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2013. "Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 219-43, November.
  2. Sgobbi, Alessandra & Carraro, Carlo, 2011. "A Stochastic Multiple Players Multi-Issues Bargaining Model for the Piave River Basin," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 1(2), pages 119-150, April.
  3. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier.

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