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A Relation Between Nash Equilibria And Correlated Equilibria

Author

Listed:
  • RUUD HENDRICKX

    (CentER and Department of Econometrics and OR, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, Tilburg, 5000 LE, The Netherlands)

  • RONALD PEETERS

    (Department of Economics, Universiteit Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, Maastricht, 6200 MD, The Netherlands)

  • JOS POTTERS

    (Department of Mathematics, Nijmegen University, P.O. Box 9010, Nijmegen, 6500 GL, The Netherlands)

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the set of correlated equilibria of bimatrix games. These equilibria are interesting, because they can result in outcome profiles that are not feasible as a result of Nash equilibria. After giving an example to illustrate the various concepts, we present a Projection Theorem which relates the two types of equilibria. Some lemmas are provided to clarify and extend this theorem.

Suggested Citation

  • Ruud Hendrickx & Ronald Peeters & Jos Potters, 2002. "A Relation Between Nash Equilibria And Correlated Equilibria," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 4(04), pages 405-413.
  • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:04:y:2002:i:04:n:s021919890200077x
    DOI: 10.1142/S021919890200077X
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ramsey, David M. & Szajowski, Krzysztof, 2008. "Selection of a correlated equilibrium in Markov stopping games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 184(1), pages 185-206, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash equilibria; correlated equilibria; projection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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