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Endogenous Specialization, Endogenous Transaction Costs, And The Theory Of The Firm

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Author Info
XIAOKAI YANG (Department of Economics, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, 3800, Australia)

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Abstract

In the paper the trade-offs among endogenous transaction costs caused by two-sided moral hazard, exogenous monitoring cost, and economies of specialization are specified in a Grossman, Hart and Moore (GHM) model to absorb Maskin and Tirole's recent critique and Holmstrom and Milgrom's criticism of the model of incomplete contract. The extended GHM model allowing incomplete contingent labour contract as well as complete contingent trade contract of goods is used to explore the implications of structure of ownership and residual rights for the equilibrium network size of division of labour and productivity.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal Division of Labor & Transaction Costs.

Volume (Year): 01 (2006)
Issue (Month): 02 ()
Pages: 105-126
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Handle: RePEc:wsi:dltcxx:v:01:y:2006:i:02:p:105-126

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Related research
Keywords: Theory of the firm; incomplete labour contract; asymmetric authority; two-sided moral hazard; transaction cost; asymmetric residual rights; division of labour; specialization;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
D - Microeconomics
E1 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models
F - International Economics
F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
F16 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Labor Market Interactions
J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
L - Industrial Organization
O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth

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